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This article examines the increasing role of the Chapman Rule and its effect on the harmless error doctrine
and outlines a coherent doctrine of constitutional error responsive to the purposes of the various
constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. Part I evaluates the Court's existing harmless error
jurisprudence. Part II proposes a harmless error doctrine that, unlike the Court's approach, responds to
constitutional values unrelated to truth determination. The last two parts of the Article address two problems
precipitated by the use of outcome-oriented rules to define and remedy constitutional error. Part III discusses
when such a rule should be used at trial to decide when constitutional error has occurred. Finally, Part IV
develops a formulation of the Chapman rule that ensures that appellate courts will not rely upon their own
evaluations of the weight and credibility of the evidence in deciding whether a constitutional error has
affected the outcome.
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RETHINKING HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
Tom Stacy *
& Kim Dayton**
Since the early 1970s, some observers of the Supreme Court have
predicted that the Burger Court would sweep aside many of the Warren
Court's more controversial decisions involving civil liberties.' In the
area of constitutional criminal procedure, many believed that the
Burger Court would overrule decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio2 and
Miranda v. Arizona,3 which expanded rights that do not directly relate to
a defendant's guilt or innocence. 4 Writing in the early 1980s, however,
a number of commentators argued that although the Burger Court's
decisions regarding constitutional criminal procedure contained rheto-
ric exalting the truth-determining function of the criminal process over
all others, the differences between the Burger and Warren Courts' sub-
stantive decisions had been greatly exaggerated. 5
In distinguishing between rhetoric and reality, these commentators
have overlooked the Burger and now Rehnquist Courts' increasingly
widespread use of the doctrine of harmless constitutional error. After
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A. 1979; J.D. 1983,
University of Michigan.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A. 1980, University of Kan-
sas; J.D. 1983, University of Michigan.
We would like to thank Professor Sid Shapiro for his insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. The research for this Article was supported by University of
Kansas General Research allocation #3832-XO-0038.
1. See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1227 (1971);
Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 Geo. L. J. 249,
277 (1971).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule ap-
plies to the states).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. E.g., L. Levy, Against the Law 68-75 (1974); Chase, The Burger Court, the Indi-
vidual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 518,
595 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1324 (1977); Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It
Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?),
and Police Investigatory Practices, in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That
Wasn't 62, 68 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 Geo. LJ. 151, 158
(1980); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 445-46 (1980). Professor
Kamisar has recently retreated from his earlier appraisal of the Burger Court. Kamisar,
The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Bur-
ger Court, in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969-1986,
143, 145 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987) [hereinafter Kamisar, Police Practice Phases].
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gradually applying the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California6 to
more and more types of constitutional errors, the Supreme Court re-
cently declared that the Chapman rule presumptively applies to virtually
all types of federal constitutional errors.7 As a result, constitutional er-
ror generally does not necessitate automatic reversal of a criminal con-
viction: error is harmless and the conviction must be upheld when an
appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had
no impact on the ultimate finding of guilt.8 With its harmless error
doctrine, as well as with its holdings in other areas of criminal proce-
dure,9 the Supreme Court clearly extends its preoccupation with factual
guilt beyond mere rhetoric.
Injustifying nearly ubiquitous use of a harmless error rule focusing
on the outcome of the trial, the Supreme Court has appealed to the
truth- determining function of the criminal trial, declaring that "'the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of
the defendant's guilt or innocence.' "10 This reasoning, which lies at
the very core of the Court's harmless error jurisprudence, denigrates
6. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In this Article, we are concerned only with problems associ-
ated with the doctrine of harmless constitutional error in criminal prosecutions. For a
discussion of some of the differences between constitutional and nonconstitutional
harmless error rules, see United States v. Lane, 106 S. Ct. 725, 738 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750
(1946); Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 421, 422-23 (1980) (discussing history of nonconstitutional harmless error
rules).
7. Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106-07 (1986) ("[I]f the defendant had counsel
and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other
errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis."). For a list of the
types of constitutional error that may be held harmless, see infra notes 27-32 and ac-
companying text.
8. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ("beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained").
9. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521-22 (1986) (constitutional
rules that exclude reliable evidence from the criminal trial should be narrowly con-
strued); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 (1986) (plurality opinion) (habeas
petitioner must make "colorable showing of factual innocence" to have court consider a
successive habeas petition); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 922 (1984) (creat-
ing exception to exclusionary rule when police rely in good faith on warrant in obtaining
evidence in violation of the fourth amendment); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655
(1984) (creating "public safety" exception to Miranda); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482 (1977) (fourth amendment violations generally are not cognizable in federal habeas
corpus proceedings); see also Chase, supra note 4, at 519 (noting that the Court's deci-
sions reflect a preoccupation with accurate results in individual cases); Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035,
1077 (1977) (discussing emphasis on factual guilt-innocence in Court's habeas corpus
decisions); Note, Guilt, Innocence, and Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65 Cornell L.
Rev. 1123, 1135 (1980) (noting Court's emerging view that habeas corpus should only
protect constitutional claims directly concerning the process of guilt-determination).
10. Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3105-06 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431,
1436-37 (1986)).
[Vol. 88:79
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important constitutional protections accorded criminal suspects. By ef-
fectively treating all constitutional rights as designed to promote only
factual accuracy, the Court undermines those rights that promote val-
ues other than the reliability of guilty verdicts.
Scholars have for the most part ignored recent developments in
this area. 1 I This inattention is most unfortunate. Although the resolu-
tion of an increasing proportion of direct appeals and habeas corpus
proceedings now turns on an application of the Chapman rule,' 2 ex-
isting harmless error jurisprudence is seriously flawed in at least three
respects. First, the Court's harmless error decisions rest on a premise
that ignores the purposes of many fundamental constitutional protec-
tions enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Second, the Court has without
explanation oscillated between use of two different standards of preju-
dice to define rights and identify constitutional error. When certain
rights are involved, the Court has instructed trial courts not to find er-
ror unless the alleged infringement will likely affect the outcome of the
trial. In contrast, with other rights, the Court has imposed a more re-
laxed standard that recognizes constitutional violations at trial regard-
less of whether they will affect the determination of guilt. Third, the
Court's opinions send conflicting signals concerning the scope of re-
view that the Chapman harmless error rule entails. Existing formula-
tions of the standard vary widely,' 3 and in applying these formulations,
11. The leading works are all more than 10 years old. R. Traynor, The Riddle of
Harmless Error (1970); Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Er-
ror-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976); Mause, Harmless
Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 519
(1969); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1973). These
works not only antedate several important developments, they also unquestioningly ac-
cept the basic premises of the Supreme Court's approach. See infra note 38. For stu-
dent commentary, see Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64
Cornell L. Rev. 538 (1979) [hereinafter Cornell Note]; Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error: A Reappraisal, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 814 (1970) [hereinafter Harvard Note]; Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 83 (1967) [hereinafter Stanford Note];
Note, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 616
(1974) [hereinafter Chicago Note].
12. Precise statistics as to the number of cases in the federal and state courts raising
harmless constitutional error questions are unavailable. One commentator estimated in
1980 that "possibly as high as ten percent of all criminal appeals during the last thirteen
years" involved an application of the Chapman harmless error rule. Goldberg, supra
note 6, at 421 & n.3; see also Cornell Note, supra note 11, at 544-48 (noting dramatic
increase in number of cases in federal courts of appeals involving harmless error). In
light of the Supreme Court's recent expansion of the doctrine to cover "most constitu-
tional violations," United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983), as well as the
substantial share of all habeas corpus proceedings that involve the Chapman rule, this
10% figure now seems unduly conservative.
13. Many courts and commentators have noted the confusion surrounding the
meaning of harmless constitutional error. See, e.g., Holland v. Attorney Gen., 777 F.2d
150, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1985); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 885 (5th Cir. 1980) (T.
Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); R.
Traynor, supra note 11, at 80; 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
1988]
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many courts have assumed virtually unreviewable discretion to evaluate
the weight and credibility of the evidence. 14 In effect, existing under-
standings of harmless error standards enable appellate courts to per-
form fact-finding functions that the sixth amendment entrusts to ajury.
This Article examines these criticisms and outlines a coherent doc-
trine of constitutional error responsive to the purposes of the various
constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. Part I evalu-
ates the Court's existing harmless error jurisprudence. Part II pro-
poses a harmless error doctrine that, unlike the Court's approach,
responds to constitutional values unrelated to truth determination.
The last two parts of the Article address two problems precipitated by
the use of outcome-oriented rules to define and remedy constitutional
error. Part III discusses when such a rule should be used at trial to
decide when constitutional error has occurred. Finally, Part IV devel-
ops a formulation of the Chapman rule that ensures that appellate courts
will not rely upon their own evaluations of the weight and credibility of
the evidence in deciding whether a constitutional error has affected the
outcome.
I. EXISTING HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
A. The Court
The doctrine of harmless constitutional error is of relatively recent
origin. Although statutes directing courts to find trial errors "harm-
less" unless they affect "substantial rights" have existed since the early
twentieth century,' 5 until 1967 it was unclear whether constitutional er-
§ 103[08] (1986) [hereinafter Weinstein's Evidence]; Field, supra note 11, at 16;
Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 988; Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere &Johnson, Evaluating the
Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: CanJudges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on
Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1147, 1177-81 [hereinafter Teitelbaum]; Note, Harmless
Constitutional Error: An Analysis of Its Current Application, 33 Baylor L. Rev. 961,
961-64 (1981); Note, Confusion in the Court-Wisconsin's Harmless Error Rule in
Criminal Appeals, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 643, 648 (1980); Note, Harmless Error: The Need
for a Uniform Standard, 53 St.John's L. Rev. 541, 543-57 (1979) [hereinafter St.John's
Note].
14. See United States v. Garza, 754 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he widespread use of the harmless error rule ... can only lead to ad
hoc decision-making, reflecting not impartial justice but the personal beliefs of the court
regarding the defendant's guilt."); cf. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 436 ("Harmless consti-
tutional error provides [both state and federal appellate courts] an opportunity to 'de-
stroy or dilute constitutional guarantees.' ") (quoting Harlan, J., dissenting in Chapman,
386 U.S. at 50).
15. For the history of modern harmless error statutes, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22;
Mause, supra note 11, at 519-20; Stanford Note, supra note 11, at 83-84; Comment,
Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74J. Crim. L. & Criminology 457,
459-60 (1983). The current federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982),
incorporates a harmless error statute enacted in 1919, Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48,
40 Stat. 1181. In addition to the federal statute, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rule 61), the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 52(a)) and the Federal Rules
(Vol. 88:79
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rors occurring in a criminal trial could ever be harmless. 16 In Chapman
v. California,17 however, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the no-
tion that all constitutional errors require that a defendant's conviction
be set aside. In Chapman, although noting that "some constitutional
rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless," 18 the Court nevertheless held that "there may be
some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are
so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the fed-
eral constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic re-
versal of the conviction." 19 Placing the burden of persuasion on the
prosecution, the Court said that "before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'20 It proceeded
to apply this harmless error rule to the constitutional error before it,
which involved the prosecutor's repeated comments on the defendant's
failure to testify.
2 1
Commentators writing in Chapman's immediate aftermath were un-
certain whether most constitutional errors would be treated under a
harmless error rule rather than a rule of automatic reversal. 22 Appel-
of Evidence (Rule 103(a)) all contain harmless error provisions. All 50 states have harm-
less error statutes or rules. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
16. Before Chapman, those federal courts to consider the question had generally
assumed that constitutional error was always harmful. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); Starrv. United States, 264 F.2d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 936 (1959); Fina v. United States, 46 F.2d 643, 644 (10th
Cir. 1931). But see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 475-76 (1900) (violation of
sixth amendment right of confrontation harmless when defendant had confessed under
oath). In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), the Supreme Court intimated, but
did not actually hold, that constitutional error could in some circumstances be harmless.
See generally Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the
Federal Courts, 3 Vill. L. Rev. 48, 67 (1957) (reversal follows constitutional error re-
gardless of error's consequences); Mause, supra note 11, at 520-23 (discussing pre-1967
uncertainty as to whether constitutional error could be harmless).
17. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 24-26. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Court held that
prosecutorial or judicial comment on the defendant's failure to testify unduly burdens
the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and thus
amounts to constitutional error.
22. See, e.g., Mause, supra note 11, at 557 (suggesting that Chapman could be read
as creating an exception to "a general rule of automatic reversal"); Stanford Note, supra
note 11, at 98. Other commentators speculated that as a practical matter, Chapman
would have little impact on criminal appeals involving constitutional error because "the
possibility that a particular error will be found 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt'
seems slight." The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 207 (1967); cf.
Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3111 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Rather than creating a broad, new presumption in favor of harmless error analysis...
Chapman merely rejected the notion that such analysis was always impermissible and
1988]
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late courts likewise exhibited uncertainty regarding the specific rights
to which Chapman applies. 23 After expanding the category of constitu-
tional rights subject to the Chapman rule for more than a decade, the
Supreme Court finally clarified its approach, stating that "it is the duty
of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ig-
nore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions."' 24 Recently, in Rose v. Clark,25 the Court went further, declaring
that the Chapman rule is presumptively appropriate for virtually every
kind of constitutional error. According to the Rose Court: "while there
are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the excep-
tion and not the rule .... [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried
by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any
other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error
analysis."
26
As these statements suggest, the Chapman outcome-oriented harm-
less error rule now applies to a broad array of constitutional errors.
Errors the Court has held may be deemed harmless include errors in-
volving the fourth amendment, 27 the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, 28 the right to adduce exculpatory evidence at trial29 the right
of a defendant to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding
30
and the right to have counsel at a pretrial lineup.3 1 Lower courts have
articulated a rigorous standard for determining whether a presumptively prejudicial er-
ror could, in fact, be deemed harmless.").
23. For example, until the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct.
3101 (1986), lower courts had divided over whether an improper burden-shifting in-
struction could ever be considered harmless. Compare Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496,
1501-03 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Chapman applies), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3340
(1986) with In re Hamilton, 721 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1983) (Chapman inapplica-
ble if intent is at issue); see also infra note 152..
24. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (emphasis added).
25. 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
26. Id. at 3106-07 (citations omitted).
27. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
28. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2065-66 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106
S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986).
29. Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986).
30. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 (1983); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11
(1970).
31. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977). Other constitutional errors that
the Court has expressly or impliedly held subject to the Chapman rule include the due
process right against a burden-shifting jury instruction, Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101,
3107 (1986); the due process right against improper prosecutorial argument, Darden v.
Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2472-73 (1986); the due process right against unduly sug-
gestive pretrial identification procedures, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14
(1977); violations of the right of confrontation upon the admission of inculpatory out-of-
court statements made by nontestifying codefendants (the doctrine of Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)), Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973); the
sixth amendment right not to be interrogated by government agents once the right to
counsel has attached (the doctrine of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)),
[Vol. 88:79
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 84 1988
HARMLESS ERROR
expanded this list, adding, for instance, Miranda violations.3 2 In addi-
tion to using an outcome-oriented test as a harmless error rule to deter-
mine the availability of a remedy for constitutional error, the Court has
in some contexts used such a standard as a prejudice test to define
whether constitutional error has occurred at trial. A defendant, for in-
stance, has a right to discover exculpatory evidence in the govern-
ment's possession only if there is a "reasonable probability" that the
evidence will affect the trial's outcome.33 The cumulative effect of all of
these developments is that appellate courts now regularly uphold con-
victions because an asserted error had no impact on the result of the
proceeding.3
4
It is important to understand the reasoning that the Court has used
to extend the reach of the Chapman harmless error rule and the "rea-
sonable probability of a different result" prejudice test. Language in
the Court's harmless error decisions occasionally suggests that a con-
cern forjudicial efficiency justifies the doctrine of harmless error.35 Yet
the Court has implicitly acknowledged that, at least on direct appeal,
the interests of judicial efficiency and finality do not permit reviewing
courts idly to countenance a constitutional violation that has thwarted a
particular right's core purpose.
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 378 (1972); the sixth amendment right to confron-
tation, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969); cf. Hopper v. Evans, 456
U.S. 605, 613-14 (1982) (citing Chapman and finding no prejudice from trial court's fail-
ure to instruct on lesser-included offenses).
32. Federal appellate courts have uniformly held that Miranda violations, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may constitute harmless error. See, e.g.,
Gorham v. Franzen, 760 F.2d 786, 795-96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 922 (1985);
United States v. Hall, 739 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d
1151, 1157 (8th Cir. 1984); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875-77 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, has never held
that Miranda violations are subject to harmless error analysis. See Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 444 n. 40 (1984) (leaving issue open).
Other constitutional errors that lower courts have subjected to harmless error anal-
ysis include the failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense, Red-
ding v. Benson, 739 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1222 (1985); and
governmental intimidation of a potential defense witness, Peeler v. Wyrick, 734 F.2d 378
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984).
33. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, J.). In Bagley,
although only Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Blackmun's "reasonable probability"
language, three otherJustices indicated that they agreed with that standard. See Bagley,
473 U.S. at 685 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and concurring in thejudgment). See generally infra notes 155-219 and accompanying
text.
34. See United States v. Lane, 106 S. Ct. 725, 744-45 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting increasing use of harmless error doctrine); Cornell Note, supra note 11, at
539.
35. "The goal [of harmless error analysis], as ChiefJustice Traynor has noted, is to
'conserve judicial resources by enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process
of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harmless error.'' United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (quoting R. Traynor, supra note 11, at 81).
1988]
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The Court's justification for its expanded use of the Chapman rule
and an outcome-oriented prejudice test ostensibly recognizes the he-
gemony of constitutional purpose over judicial efficiency. The Court
apparently views the ultimate end of the criminal process and constitu-
tional criminal procedure as securing the accused a fair trial. Yet the
Court has expressed a reductionistic notion of what a "fair trial"
means, defining it merely as a trial designed to produce a reliable out-
come.3 6 It follows from this definition that the fairness of the trial is
not impaired by a constitutional error that has had no effect on the
finding of guilt.3 7 The last step implicit in the Court's reasoning is that
when constitutional error does not impair the fairness of the trial, con-
cerns for judicial efficiency and finality justify upholding the conviction.
The interesting feature of this reasoning, which commentators have yet
to question,3 8 is that it presumes the reliability of the result and judicial
36. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) ("In giving
meaning to [the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel], we must
take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide .... This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.") (emphasis added); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (Suppression by
prosecutor of potentially exculpatory impeachment evidence "amounts to a constitu-
tional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. Consistent with 'our
overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt,' a constitutional error occurs,
and the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.") (quoting United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)); Chase, supra note 4, at 520-24 (discussing Burger
Court's conception of a "fair trial" as one that ensures a factually correct result).
37. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986):
The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose
of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or
innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on
the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable pres-
ence of immaterial error.
Id. at 1436-37 (citation omitted).
38. The commentators have essentially accepted the basic parameters of the
Court's harmless error jurisprudence. Although some scholars have noted that the
criminal justice system protects values other than reliability, see, e.g,. W. LaFave & J.
Israel, Criminal Procedure 28-31 (1985), we have found no commentary criticizing the
Court for overemphasizing the truth-determination function of constitutional criminal
procedure in extending the reach of the Chapman rule. Consistent with the Court's em-
phasis on the reliability of the verdict, scholars have generally concentrated on whether
and how courts can accurately measure the impact of particular types of errors on the
result.
Some commentators address which of the many possible formulations of an out-
come-oriented harmless error rule best ensures reliability. See, e.g., R. Traynor, supra
note 11, at 17-25; Field, supra note 11, at 16; Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1030-32;
Harvard Note, supra note 11, at 817-29. Some commentary also focuses on the choice
between the Chapman rule and a rule of automatic reversal, assuming, as the Court does,
that the choice should turn on considerations relating to the reliability of the result. See
R. Traynor, supra note 11, at 58-65; Field, supra note 11, at 19-21; Saltzburg, supra
note 11, at 1026-27; Chicago Note, supra note 11, at 627; Cornell Note, supra note 11,
at 552; Harvard Note, supra note 11, at 821. The salient feature of all this commentary
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economy to be the only values relevant to deciding the appropriate rem-
edy for constitutional error.39
The Supreme Court's preoccupation with reliability not only is evi-
dent in the sweeping statements the Court has made about the ration-
ale for harmless error review; it also underlies the Court's explanation
of the distinction between the very broad range of constitutional errors
subject to the Chapman rule and the much narrower category of errors
requiring automatic reversal. All members of the Court appear to
agree that violations of the rights to counsel, to an impartial tribunal
and against coerced confessions can never be considered harmless.40
But what common features distinguish these rights from, for example,
the right to confront adverse witnesses or the right to compulsory pro-
cess, both of which are subject to the Chapman rule? Those rights
whose violation require automatic reversal, the Court has said, are so
basic or fundamental to a "fair trial" that in their absence "a criminal
trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence ... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as funda-
mentally fair."'4 ' According to the Court, the distinctive characteristic
is its acceptance of the premise that the harmless error doctrine should revolve around
the truth-determination function of a trial.
39. Some of the Court's opinions suggest that it may not be completely insensitive
to truth-neutral and truth-impairing values in shaping the doctrine of harmless constitu-
tional error. In Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3107 (1986), for instance, the Court
noted that the purpose of the constitutional right at issue there-the right to have the
prosecution prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt-is truth-fur-
thering and said that this purpose supported its decision to apply the Chapman rule. See
also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of self-repre-
sentation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial out-
come unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to 'harmless error'
analysis.") (dictum). The Court might be understood as suggesting that the Chapman
rule may be inappropriate for non-truth-furthering rights.
Yet the Court has never articulated a theory that expressly ties the choice between
the Chapman rule and a rule of automatic reversal to the nature of the purpose of the
right in question. In Rose, for instance, the truth-furthering purpose of the right before
it did not provide the primary rationale for its decision to apply the Chapman rule. Rose,
106 S. Ct. at 3107. Furthermore, the Court has applied the Chapman rule to violations of
fourth and fifth amendment rights, see supra notes 27 & 21, respectively, without mak-
ing any attempt to reconcile harmless error review with those rights' truth-impairing
purposes. In fact, the considerations the Court has articulated as governing the choice
between Chapman and a rule of automatic reversal relate only to the reliability of the trial
result. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
Among the Justices, only Justice Stevens has decried the Court's harmless error
jurisprudence for failing to accord proper respect to "other values besides the reliability
of the guilt or innocence determination." Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3111-12 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, however, has not proposed a coherent theory
of harmless error that would take account of these "other values." Id. at 3111 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment).
40. See, e.g., Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3106 (dictum); id. at 3111 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 3114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1437.
41. Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3106 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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of these violations is that it is either extremely difficult to know whether
they might have affected the outcome,42 or the likelihood that they have
influenced the outcome is so strong that it is not worth expending the
judicial resources necessary to evaluate the effect of the error in partic-
ular cases. 43 Under the Court's theory, then, the choice between the
Chapman rule and a rule of automatic reversal is governed by considera-
tions relating to the reliability of the result.
B. Criticisms of Prevailing Doctrine
The most basic flaw in the Court's approach is that it ignores the
central axiom that in fashioning remedial rules to correct violations of
constitutional rights, courts must be sensitive to the fundamental pur-
poses of those rights. 44 The Court's theory of harmless error-the
sweeping statements it has made about the doctrine's rationale and the
42. Id. at 3107 n.7; Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 623-24 (1986); Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978).
43. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). One might argue that
errors involving rights that pervade the entire trial process must be reversed automati-
cally because they have a special symbolic importance. This argument would assert that
wholly apart from their contribution to a reliable result, rights such as the right to coun-
sel and the right to an impartial tribunal are essential to society's perception of fairness.
Because of their lack of clarity, certain of the Justices' opinions can be read as embracing
this view. See Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2056 (1987) ("because the impartial-
ity of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, the Chapman harmless-
error analysis cannot apply") (Blackmun, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added);
Vasquez, 106 S. Ct. at 624 (racial "discrimination in the grand jury undermines the struc-
tural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself") (Marshall, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added).
The supposed symbolic importance of rights that pervade the entire trial process is
unpersuasive as a rationale for choosing between the Chapman rule and a rule of auto-
matic reversal. Because this reasoning focuses on the pervasive function rather than the
fundamental values of the right at stake, it seeks to create a symbolism that is disem-
bodied from those values. Further, it posits that courts should be concerned with an
appearance of impropriety even though that appearance has no basis whatever in reality.
If the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that any rational jury would be compelled to
convict the defendant, then the appearance of unfairness created by the denial of a
truth-furthering right is simply illusory. See infra text accompanying note 149.
44. To prevent substantive constitutional guarantees from becoming merely "a
form of words," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), courts are constitutionally
required to fashion remedies necessary to effectuate those guarantees. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946) ("[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The gov-
ernment of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the law will furnish
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."); C. Black, The Unfinished Business
of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3, 28 (1970) ("[L]aw ... is a practical subject, and
the first principle of law is that its commands, and above all its promises, are to be
translated into practice .... "); Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1135-37 (1978); Steinman, Backing Off Bivens
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reasons it has advanced in choosing between the Chapman rule and a
rule of automatic reversal in particular cases-is predicated on a con-
ception of a fair trial that incorporates only the value of factual accu-
racy. Yet even if the Court is correct in asserting that the "central
purpose 45 of most of a defendant's constitutional rights "is to ensure
that [criminal] trials lead to fair and correct judgments, '46 it is certainly
incorrect to conclude that this is the purpose of all such rights.
There can be no question that some constitutional rights, by de-
sign, oblige police, prosecutors and courts to follow certain procedures
not because those procedures enhance the accuracy of the ultimate
finding of guilt or innocence, but because they foster other goals or
values. Some of these rights are even truth impairing; that is, they de-
liberately subordinate the concern for accurate truth determination to
other values. Fourth amendment rights, which protect privacy values at
the expense of the search for the truth, are examples of such truth-
impairing rights. 47 The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is another example; it seeks to protect interests, such as privacy
and dignity, that are unrelated to truth determination.48 Other rights
can be characterized as truth neutral because they have neither a posi-
tive nor a negative impact on the reliability of the result in a criminal
proceeding. The various equal protection rights accorded to criminal
defendants, such as the right to a grand jury selected in a race-neutral
fashion, exemplify rights in this category. At least one of the purposes
of a defendant's equal protection rights is to ensure that members of
"suspect classes" participate in governmental processes on an equal
footing with others. This purpose, of course, is not directly related to a
concern for factual accuracy. 49 Finally, some rights, including many of
the classic truth-furthering rights upon which the Court has relied in
extending the reach of the Chapman rule, have mixed purposes: they
seek not only to foster the reliability of the fact-finding process, but also
to promote other truth-neutral values such as participation or fair
play.50
If one accepts the proposition that some constitutional rights have
purposes other than, or in addition to, promoting the reliability of
guilty verdicts, the flaw in the Court's approach to harmless error
analysis becomes obvious. In fashioning remedial rules to correct
and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 269, 278-81 (1984).
45. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986).
46. Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3107.
47. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973); see infra notes
99-101 and accompanying text.
48. See Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2995 (1986); see infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
49. See Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3111 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment); see also
infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
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constitutional error, courts must begin with an assessment of the funda-
mental purposes of the right implicated by the error; only then can they
select a remedy that will adequately protect that right's basic purposes.
Imagine, for instance, a case in which the prosecutor has used his per-
emptory challenges to deny a clearly guilty defendant his equal protec-
tion right to have the petit jury selected in a race-neutral fashion. A
court should be concerned with vindicating the right's participatory
purpose rather than the defendant's guilt. The Court's theory of harm-
less error glosses over this essential step in constitutional analysis, sub-
stituting its reliability conception of a fair trial for a systematic
consideration of the purposes of particular rights.
One might try to justify the Court's harmless error jurisprudence
by ascribing more weight to the value in ensuring a reliable result than
to the values underlying truth-neutral and truth-impairing rights. Ac-
cording to this justification, the stronger interest in factual accuracy tri-
umphs over the interests of finality and judicial efficiency while the
weaker truth-neutral and truth-impairing interests do not. Retrial, the
argument runs, is accordingly required when a constitutional violation
may have affected the outcome but not when such a violation, though
frustrating the core purpose of a truth-neutral or truth-impairing right,
has not affected the outcome.
This reasoning finds no support in the Constitution.5 1 The Consti-
tution does not create a hierarchy of rights or values. There is no his-
torical or structural reason to suppose that the framers intended rights
having truth-furthering purposes to carry more weight than rights hav-
ing other purposes. Admittedly, it may seem wasteful to vacate a de-
fendant's conviction and require retrial when we are quite convinced
that he will only be convicted again. But the Constitution is not merely
concerned with the end result of criminal trials; it is also concerned
with process. The Chapman rule ensures that retrial occurs when neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of a truth-furthering right that has been
violated. Because truth-impairing and truth-neutral rights are no less
important in the constitutional scheme, retrial should also be required
51. Several Justices, led by Justice Powell, have embraced a distinction between
truth-furthering and non-truth-furthering rights in supporting limitations on the scope
of federal habeas corpus review. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627
(1986) (opinion of Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, JJ., & Burger, CJ.); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 262, 266 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). This distinction can perhaps be justified as a matter of statutory construction of
the habeas corpus statutes in view of the greater sway that the interests in finality and
federalism hold in federal habeas proceedings. But see Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 579, 661-69 (1982); Yackle,
Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991, 1019-40 (1985). But the notion that
truth-furthering rights deserve greater weight than non-truth-furthering rights on direct
appeal cannot be defended as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Not surpris-
ingly, no Justice has suggested that it can.
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when necessary to vindicate the various purposes of such rights. 52
II. CHOOSING AMONG REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
Courts need a principled method for choosing the remedial rule to
apply when constitutional error has occurred. Under existing doctrine,
courts choose between the Chapman rule and a rule requiring automatic
reversal of conviction based on considerations relating only to factual
accuracy. This Part proposes a three-step method for choosing reme-
dial rules for constitutional error that begins by asking the purpose of
the particular right in question. This method, unlike current doctrine,
protects the values underlying all of a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional rights, not simply those rights designed to enhance the accuracy
of the truth-determination process.
A. A Proposed Framework
The method proposed here, which focuses explicitly on the pur-
poses of particular rights, involves three interrelated inquiries. The
first is whether the violation has impaired the purposes of the constitu-
tional right in question. Constitutional error does not necessarily un-
dermine a right's fundamental goals. If in a particular case it has not,
then the conviction should be upheld unless deterrence requires
otherwise.
53
The second inquiry, which arises only after concluding that the vio-
lation has impaired the right's purposes, considers whether redoing the
adjudicative process can effectively cure the harm caused by the viola-
tion. The loss of privacy that results from a fourth amendment viola-
tion, for instance, cannot be cured by redoing the adjudicative or even
the investigative process leading to the conviction. In this situation,
52. One could perhaps defend the Court's harmless error jurisprudence in yet an-
other way. This approach would concede that the values underlying truth-furthering
and non-truth-furthering rights are entitled to equal weight, but point out that only non-
truth-furthering rights conflict sharply with the societal interest in convicting the guilty.
This sharp conflict, one could argue, should cause courts to construe the scope of non-
truth-furthering rights more narrowly. Yet this line of reasoning, even if accepted, can-
not justify holding a violation of the central purpose of a non-truth-furthering right
harmless simply because the trial outcome was unassailably correct. If accepted, the
argument only supports taking a more parsimonious approach to construing the scope
of non-truth-furthering rights. Once the scope of such a right has been determined
giving appropriate weight to the interest in convicting the guilty, it would make little
sense to hold a violation of it harmless even though the right's core truth-neutral or
truth-impairing purpose has been frustrated and retrial would vindicate that purpose.
To do so would sap the right of meaning and would anomalously give double effect to
the interest in convicting the guilty.
53. Violations of the prosecution's Brady obligation, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, for example, may require that a
defendant's conviction be vacated even though the violation has not impaired the truth-
furthering aim of the obligation. See infra notes 103-08, 182-84 and accompanying
text.
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reversal is not required to vindicate the right's purposes in the case
before the court; the remedial rule can only be concerned with deter-
ring future violations.
5 4
The third inquiry considers the role of deterrence. Even if reversal
is not necessary to effectuate the purposes of the right violated in the
particular case before the court, reversal may be necessary to deter fu-
ture violations. Indeed, a sanction more severe than reversal may be
required to compensate for the probability that any given error involv-
ing this particular right will go undetected.
1. The Effect of the Violation on the Right's Purpose(s). - Considera-
tions of deterrence aside, a conviction should be upheld when constitu-
tional error has not frustrated a right's basic purposes: 55 the right's
underlying values do not support or require reversal, and systemic in-'
terests in finality and judicial economy tip the balance in favor of affirm-
ance. The apparent simplicity of this analysis masks some important
complications.
Consider first rights whose only purposes are truth furthering.
These rights operate to protect innocent persons from wrongful con-
viction; they relate to the premise that "it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free,"'56 and foster confidence
that criminal convictions will fall only on those who are actually
guilty.57 The purpose of a truth-furthering right is not frustrated in a
particular case if, despite the error, the record as a whole conclusively
demonstrates the defendant's guilt or at least demonstrates that the
violation could have had no effect on the jury's decision to convict.
Truth-furthering rights would thus seem to be ideally suited for
Chapman's harmless error rule, which ensures reversal of the conviction
when reliability may have been impaired, but requires affirmance when
the court is substantially certain that the constitutional error did not
undermine reliability.58
This conclusion assumes that the reviewing court can reliably as-
certain whether constitutional error may have affected the outcome.
The assumption seems valid with respect to most truth-furthering
rights.59 Suppose, for instance, that a trial court has abridged a defend-
54. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975).
55. Some constitutional rights are defined more broadly than is strictly required to
vindicate their purposes in a particular case. A violation of such a right does not inevita-
bly infringe upon the right's purposes. For a discussion of the reasons for defining a
truth-furthering right more broadly than its purpose strictly requires, see infra notes
155-84 and accompanying text. Non-truth-furthering rights may also be defined more
broadly than is required to protect their purposes in any given case.
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring).
57. Id. at 364.
58. Even in the case of errors involving truth-furthering rights, the interest in de-
terring police or prosecutorial misconduct may warrant reversing the conviction of a
clearly guilty defendant. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
59. To be sure, application of the Chapman rule leaves room for disagreement and
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ant's sixth amendment right to cross-examine a government witness for
bias.60 As in most circumstances involving the denial of a truth-further-
ing right, the record in this situation will contain all of the information
a reviewing court needs to apply Chapman's harmless error rule: the
substance of the excluded evidence, the other evidence elicited by the
defense and the evidence of guilt presented by the prosecution. Be-
cause the parties can be expected to bring the relevant aspects of the
record to its attention, a reviewing court should not have undue diffi-
culty determining whether the error may have affected the decision of a
reasonable jury.
In contrast, courts sometimes lack the information they need to
apply the Chapman rule. When a defendant has been denied counsel
altogether, for instance, the evidence of guilt may appear compelling
on the basis of the existing record. But that record does not contain
the evidence and legal argument a defense attorney might have gener-
ated. A reviewing court could obtain the missing information by im-
posing on a defendant the burden of producing evidence showing how
counsel would have made a difference. But this anomalous burden of
production would require that an uncounseled defendant articulate
how counsel could have helped him when his ignorance of what coun-
sel could have done is the reason for requiring counsel to begin with.
6 1
Thus, in this situation, as in other situations where the record does not
enable a court to apply the Chapman rule reliably, 62 the conviction must
be reversed automatically. Lacking critical information, courts may
tend to underestimate the effects of constitutional error. As the
Supreme Court has sometimes acknowledged, 63 the only safe option is
error. It requires the court to make a judgment concerning whether excluded impeach-
ment evidence, for example, might make a difference to a reasonable jury. Yet our sys-
tem tolerates error and disagreement arising from applying the admittedly imprecise
"reasonable jury" standard. No one contends, for instance, that this imprecision war-
rants abolition of summaryjudgment and directed verdict procedures, where courts also
apply a "reasonable jury" standard. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
61. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
62. See, e.g., infra notes 137-42 (right to a public trial). Unlike cases in which a
defendant has been denied counsel altogether, a reviewing court should be able to apply
the Chapman rule reliably when the trial has erroneously excluded evidence proffered by
the defense. In this latter situation, a defendant is, through his counsel, aware of the
nature of the excluded evidence; indeed, he is typically required to make at least a prof-
fer of its import to preserve the issue for'appeal.
63. The Court has from time to time used language suggesting that automatic re-
versal is justified when it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether an error resulted
in an unreliable verdict, see, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978),
but it has not expressly justified in these terms its decisions applying a rule of automatic
reversal. Nor has it cast the question of whether automatic reversal is necessary in terms
of whether a right's purposes require this remedy for a violation. This has led to a great
deal of confusion in cases involving non-truth-furthering rights such as the fifth amend-
ment. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
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for courts to assume as a matter of course that error has undercut the
right's truth-furthering purpose.
Although in most situations the Chapman rule may be relied upon
to identify when constitutional error has undermined the purpose of a
truth-furthering right, it furnishes no guide in determining whether the
purpose of a truth-neutral or a truth-impairing right has been thwarted.
Courts must focus on the particular truth-neutral or truth-impairing
purpose in question, not the impact of the error on the outcome of the
proceeding. If constitutional error has not frustrated that purpose, the
error is harmless and the court should uphold the conviction unless
reversal is necessary to deter future violations.
2. The Value of Redoing the Process. - If a court concludes that a con-
stitutional error has impaired the purpose of the right in question, it
must then ask whether redoing the adjudicative process can cure the
damage. If it can, the conviction must be reversed and the process
redone to effectuate the purpose of the right in that case, thereby mak-
ing the defendant whole. If, on the other hand, redoing the process
cannot undo the harm caused by constitutional error, reversal may be
pointless. The interests in judicial economy and finality require that
the conviction be upheld unless reversal or some more severe sanction
can be justified on grounds of deterrence.
In determining whether redoing some aspect of the adjudicative
process can cure the damage the violation has caused, a court must
again focus on the purpose of the right in question. Obviously, redoing
the adjudicative process can undo the harm that stems from error in-
volving a truth-furthering right, for the harm caused by such errors oc-
curs during that process and is related to its end result. When, for
example, the court has erroneously excluded exculpatory evidence, the
remedy of a new trial at which the evidence is admitted can remove any
possibility of an unreliable result created by the error.
But in certain instances involving non-truth-furthering rights, re-
doing the trial or some other aspect of the adjudicative process cannot
rectify the constitutional errors. For example, the fourth amendment
carves out a zone of personal privacy into which the government may
not unreasonably intrude. Once the government has invaded this pri-
vate sphere and exposed it to public view by introducing illegally seized
evidence at trial, a new trial cannot restore the loss of privacy. The
same conclusion applies to violations of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination if one understands the privilege as shielding
a sphere of mental privacy from governmental intrusion.
64
Of course, errors involving other non-truth-furthering rights can
be cured by redoing the adjudicative process. For example, the right to
64. Double jeopardy violations furnish another example. One of the purposes of
the double jeopardy ban against retrial is to "protect an individual from suffering the
embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of another trial for the same offense." Morris v.
Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 247 (1986).
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represent oneself is intended to have a therapeutic or dignitary func-
tion by enabling the defendant to participate in the proceedings against
him. 65 When a trial court has frustrated this truth-neutral function of
the right by preventing an undeniably guilty defendant from represent-
ing himself, a new trial at which the defendant has the opportunity to
represent himself can cure the wrong and will vindicate the right's in-
tended function. Likewise, when a defendant has been indicted by a
grand jury selected in a racially discriminatory fashion, convening a
new grand jury that has been selected properly will protect the pur-
poses of the right involved.
66
In cases where redoing the adjudicative process can correct the
damage constitutional error has wrought, it does not matter that the
interests in finality and judicial economy favor upholding the convic-
tion; these interests are simply insufficient to override the essential pur-
poses of constitutional guarantees.
67
3. The Role of Deterrence. - If a court were concerned only with
remedying a particular error in a particular case, it would never reverse
a conviction when constitutional error has not impaired a right's pur-
pose or when the effect of constitutional error could not be repaired by
retrial. A court's concerns must, however, extend beyond furnishing a
remedy to the defendant in the particular case before it. Specifically, a
court must be concerned with whether and to what extent the remedial
rule it chooses will deter future violations of the constitutional right in
question.
Deterrence becomes a relevant concern in two situations. First,
when courts cannot effectively remedy the harm resulting from a partic-
ular type of constitutional error after the fact, they must attempt to
minimize the occurrence of such errors. Only by deterring error in fu-
ture cases can courts effectuate the values underlying constitutional
rights falling into this category, such as fourth amendment rights and
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Second, even when redoing the adjudicative process can repair the
damage an error has already wrought, courts must use an overcompen-
satory sanction to prevent those errors that often escape detection.
Our adversary system presumes that defense counsel will identify con-
stitutional errors occurring on the record or in the presence of the de-
fendant. Constitutional errors occurring off the record or outside the
defendant's presence, however, may escape detection even though de-
fense counsel performs adequately. Consider, for example, cases in
which the prosecutor has knowingly used perjured testimony,68 or has
65. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21, 834 (1975); see infra notes 130-34
and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Williams v. Griswald, 743
F.2d 1533 (11 th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bigeleisen, 625 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1980);
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resorted to abusive tactics in secret grand jury proceedings. The facts
establishing constitutional error of this type are typically known only to
the prosecutor. Because the prosecutor has shown a willingness to
abuse judicial processes, 69 it is reasonable to conclude that he will ac-
tively conceal his actions and that a significant number of errors of this
type will escape detection. To eliminate incentives to commit this type
of error, courts must use a sanction that is sufficient to compensate for
the probability that any given violation will remain undetected and
unremedied.
70
The appropriate level of deterrence varies, depending on which
justification applies. Because sanctions such as reversing the conviction
or barring reprosecution altogether entail significant social costs,
courts should choose the minimum sanction necessary to protect a
right's purposes.
When the probability that a given type of violation will be discov-
ered is close to 100% and deterrence is relevant only because the adju-
dicative process cannot effectively repair damage wrought by a
particular type of constitutional error, the Chapman rule seems to be an
adequate deterrent. When constitutional error originates with the po-
lice or prosecutor, the Chapman rule will ensure that error does not aid
these officials in obtaining a conviction. In this situation, because virtu-
ally all violations are detected, reversal will always occur when law en-
forcement officials needed the fruits of a violation to convict; reversal
will not occur when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt those fruits
were not needed. Under Chapman, law enforcement officials will thus
be unable to use error to obtain a conviction that they would not have
been able to obtain without error. Chapman, however, does not
completely eliminate all incentives to commit error because, first, law
enforcement officials may be motivated to incarcerate a defendant until
a reviewing court reverses,7 1 and, second, a prosecutor's chances of
obtaining a valid conviction may in some circumstances be better at a
United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002
(1981).
69. See generally Arenella, Reforming the Federal GrandJury and the State Prelim-
inary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 463,
539-57 (1980).
70. For examples of the growing body of literature on the considerations involved
in devising legal rules that furnish an optimal level of deterrence, see Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985); Posner, Excessive Sanc-
tions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 635 (1982);
Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49; Shavell, Criminal
Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
1232 (1985).
71. A defendant must bear a heavy burden-clear and convincing evidence that he
will not flee and does not pose a danger to the community-to obtain a stay of his
sentence pending appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (1982).
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second trial.72 Yet in the eyes of a prosecutor, these potential benefits
may well be outweighed by the time and expense of a retrial and the
adverse effect of reversal on his professional reputation. Thus, it seems
reasonable to suppose that Chapman, on balance, gives law enforcement
officials a disincentive to commit error and use its fruits. If so, the
Chapman rule sufficiently deters constitutional error which, though easy
to detect, creates harm that is not remediable by redoing the adjudica-
tive process.
73
The relatively mild deterrence flowing from the Chapman rule,
however, may well be insufficient when there is a significant probability
that any given error of a particular type will escape detection. If prose-
cutors or police feel they stand a significant chance of escaping detec-
tion after committing constitutional error, they will likely conclude that
the benefits from added convictions obtained with undetected constitu-
tional violations outweigh the time, expense and embarrassment of the
occasional reversal and retrial. This is especially true because the
Chapman rule excuses errors committed in cases where the defendant
would clearly have been convicted anyway; the prosecutors or police
will suffer a reversal only where they might not have gained a convic-
tion on legitimate grounds.
A rule of automatic reversal may create disincentives sufficient
enough to deter constitutional violations even though they often re-
main undetected. Because law enforcement officials, upon committing
error, presumably often do not know whether their case will become so
strong that the error would have been declared harmless under
Chapman, they face the possibility of an automatic reversal despite being
able to prove guilt on wholly legitimate grounds. This seemingly sig-
nificant disincentive may outweigh the benefits from convictions ob-
tained through undetected constitutional violations.
Nevertheless, the expected probability that error will go unde-
tected, if sufficiently great, will certainly cause the potential benefits
from committing error to outweigh the potential harms. Consequently,
72. At a second trial, the prosecution will have advance knowledge of the precise
nature of the defense. Inasmuch as the government has vastly superior investigative
resources and the defendant usually is aware of the nature of the prosecutor's case even
before the first trial, this knowledge increases the likelihood of a conviction.
73. The Chapman rule would also seem appropriate when the error originates with
the judge rather than the prosecutor or police. In cases where the judge has intention-
ally engaged in misconduct, for instance, it is reasonable to suppose that he is motivated
by a desire that the defendant be convicted. The Chapman rule ensures that the miscon-
duct does not increase the chances of a conviction, thereby eliminating the incentive to
engage in the misconduct. Moreover, the rule may even create disincentives by requir-
ing the judge to sit through a retrial and to suffer the embarrassment of reversal.
The Chapman rule also deters negligent judicial error. Because the judge is aware
that he may have to retry the case and suffer reversal, he will be induced to exercise care
in ascertaining and honoring the defendant's rights. In addition, because the Chapman
rule ensures that constitutional error is to the prosecution's disadvantage, it gives prose-
cutors an incentive to prevent the judge from lapsing into error.
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there may need to be a more severe sanction for types of constitutional
error that often escape detection. The social costs of barring re-
prosecution after reversal of the conviction make such a bar an unat-
tractive option. Consistent imposition of some sort of discipline upon
the responsible officials, together with automatic reversal, may be the
most appropriate way of deterring constitutional error that is difficult
to detect.74
B. Application of the Proposed Approach
Although the Court's theory of harmless error does not accommo-
date truth-neutral or truth-impairing values, 75 the Court surprisingly
has chosen the proper remedial rule for many errors involving rights
having clearly truth-impairing or truth-neutral purposes. Unlike the
Court's approach, however, the framework outlined here yields a prin-
cipled justification for these decisions. It is also surprising that some of
the Court's decisions respecting truth-furthering rights are inconsistent
with this framework and others are at least highly suspect. The
problems stem from the Court's failure to consider the possibility that
truth-furthering rights also have non-truth-furthering purposes, to ar-
ticulate the reasons why courts are unable to measure the impact of a
given type of violation on a case-by-case basis, and to consider the role
of deterrence.
The approach proposed here does not yield easy solutions in every
instance. 76 A critical-and difficult-pa'rt of applying this approach re-
quires courts to identify the fundamental purposes of the constitutional
right at stake. The approach, however, does ensure that the choice of a
74. Courts sometimes suggest that considerations of "judicial integrity" furnish an
independent justification for choosing a particular constitutional remedy. But judicial
integrity, which seeks to ensure that results of the judicial process are not tainted by
constitutional error, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-62 (1974) (Brennan,
Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), requires courts to reverse a conviction only when
other considerations also compel reversal.
Judicial integrity obviously does not require that a defendant's conviction be re-
versed when constitutional error has not thwarted the purpose of the underlying right.
A court can uphold the conviction without putting its imprimatur on any harm of consti-
tutional significance. When, on the other hand, constitutional error has impaired a
right's purposes, our theory requires either automatic reversal (when redoing the adju-
dicative process can repair the damage to the right's purposes) or application of the
Chapman rule (to deter future violations if the damage cannot be repaired). Judicial in-
tegrity does not require more than this; it is adequately protected by the Chapman rule.
When a court applying the Chapman rule concludes that constitutional error could not
have affected the outcome, it in no way ratifies the error by affirming the conviction.
75. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
76. Obviously, this Article cannot develop the framework's application to each and
every one of the constitutional rights that criminal defendants possess. The discussion
is therefore limited to those rights that best illustrate how the approach proposed here
differs from the Court's and how the adoption of this approach would change, justify or
clarify existing law.
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remedial rule turns on a right's underlying values rather than on a con-
clusory characterization of the right as basic or not or on an unexam-
ined conception of a "fair trial."
1. Truth-Neutral or Truth-Impairing Rights.
a. The Right to a Grand Jury Selected in a Race-Neutral Fashion. - This
past Term, in Vasquez v. Hillery,77 the Supreme Court held that racial
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, a violation of a de-
fendant's equal protection rights, is not rendered harmless by his sub-
sequent conviction by a petit jury. The Court's reasoning was an
unsatisfying and confusing melange of concerns for the fairness of the
outcome, judicial integrity and deterrence. The majority in Vasquez ap-
peared to view this equal protection right as based at least in part on a
concern for the outcome of the grand jury process. 78 It said, for in-
stance, that the purpose of the grand jury is not only to ensure that the
state's evidence supports a finding of probable cause that the defendant
committed a crime, but also to select the severity and number of the
offenses with which the defendant will be charged.79 In the majority's
view, the right to be free from racial discrimination ensures that the
values of all discrete racial groups are included in the grand jury pro-
cess. In support of its decision to employ a per se rule of reversal, the
Court reasoned that it could not be sure that the intentional exclusion
of blacks had had no effect on the grand jury's charging decisions.
80
In deciding whether the Vasquez majority was correct in focusing on
the outcome, one must define the nature and purpose of the equal pro-
tection right at stake. A criminal defendant's equal protection right to
object to race discrimination in the selection of his grand jury may be
seen to derive from his right not to be indicted on the basis of his race.
The reasoning may be that an improperly constituted grand jury cre-
ates an unacceptably high risk of a racially biased indictment. If the
right is viewed in these terms, the Court should have focused more
clearly on whether the defendant's subsequent conviction by a properly
selected petit jury reduced the risk of a racially biased indictment to a
constitutionally permissible level.
Alternatively, the nature of the equal protection right may be char-
acterized as permitting members of racial minorities to participate in
the criminal justice system on an equal footing with other racial
groups.8 ' The exclusion of blacks from the grand jury, therefore,
77. 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986).
78. Id. at 623 ("[E]ven if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is con-
firmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way
suggests that the discrimination did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indict-
ment and, consequently, the nature or very existence of the proceedings to come.").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 624.
81. See Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986):
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would infringe upon the equal protection rights of those blacks in the
community who might have served, and not upon the defendant's
rights. Under this theory, a defendant is given standing to enforce the
rights of these persons because he is in a far better position to discover,
and has a greater incentive to rectify, error.
82
Conceived in this way, the purpose of the equal protection right at
stake in Vasquez would seem to relate not at all to the grand jury's sub-
stantive charging decisions. Whether or not the discriminatory exclu-
sion of blacks from the grand jury has an effect on the grand jury's
charging decisions, exclusion violates the right's purpose of ensuring
that minorities participate in governmental processes. Redoing that
part of the process affected by the error, that is, permitting a grand jury
selected in a race-neutral fashion to reconsider probable cause and pos-
sibly reindict the defendant, would cure the harm caused by the error.
8 3
Whether the purpose of the equal protection right is viewed as
safeguarding against a risk of a racially biased indictment or as ensuring
the participation of minorities in the criminal justice system, our frame-
work suggests that the Court adopted an unnecessarily broad remedy
in Vasquez. The Court's remedy requires that a defendant's conviction
be reversed and a new trial held whenever this kind of equal protection
violation has occurred. Yet, however characterized, the harm caused by
the equal protection violation can be undone simply by having a grand
jury that is selected in a nondiscriminatory fashion reconsider the case.
Because of the costs associated with retrial, the conviction should be
By serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures,
the rule [prohibiting racial discrimination in the impanelment of the petit jury
may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the
decision serves other values as well. [It] ensures that States do not discriminate
against citizens who are summoned to sit in judgment against a member of
their own race and strengthens public confidence in the administration of
justice.
Id. at 2880.
82. In Vasquez, the Court observed that although those who have been wrongly ex-
cluded from grand jury service in theory have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such
suits are "extremely rare" because those excluded "are often without knowledge of the
discriminatory practices and without incentive to launch costly legal battles to stop
them." Vasquez, 106 S. Ct. at 623 n.5. For discussions of the doctrine of third party
standing, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953); Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1984).
83. One can imagine some cases in which the harm caused by a violation of the
right could not be cured by redoing the grand jury process. Suppose, for example, that
the error occurred many years before the defendant discovers it, as was the case in
Vasquez. By the time the defendant raises the error, the composition of the community
from which grand juries were drawn many years earlier may have changed so signifi-
cantly that redoing the process will not ensure that those originally excluded from the
grand jury on the basis of their race will be in the pool from which the curative grand
jury is selected. Even if this is the case, reversing the conviction may still be required by
considerations of deterrence.
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vacated only when the new grand jury declines to indict or decides to
charge the defendant with different offenses.
The right to be free from race discrimination in the selection of a
grand jury may also be seen to derive from a due process right to a
representative grand jury instead of from equal protection. In contrast
to the possible purposes of the equal protection right, the purpose of
the due process right would be to ensure reliable factual determina-
tions, to guard against prosecutorial overreaching, and to ensure that
charging decisions conform to the community's fundamental sense of
justice. In fact, this is essentially how the Vasquez majority viewed the
purposes of the equal protection right. If the purposes of the right are
construed this broadly, then the proper inquiry is, again, whether those
purposes were impaired, and whether redoing the process can cure the
resulting harm. A defendant's subsequent conviction by a petit jury en-
sures that the discrimination did not thwart the truth-furthering pur-
pose of the right.
Finally, constitutional errors involving racial discrimination in the
grand jury selection process might be especially difficult to detect, thus
calling for added deterrence. This would depend primarily on whether
the selection of the grand jury is open to inspection by defense counsel.
If the level of detection is low, reversal would be appropriate regardless
of whether a new grand jury does or would indict. Furthermore, if the
Court is especially concerned about purging our criminal justice system
of racial discrimination, reversal might be seen to communicate the ap-
propriate message.
b. The Right Against Coerced Confessions. - The Court has said sev-
eral times that admission of a coerced confession may never be consid-
ered harmless.8 4 Yet it has also held that the unconstitutional
admission of other types of confessions may be held harmless. The
Court has held, for instance, that the admission of a confession ob-
tained in violation of the Massiah doctrine, which prohibits police from
questioning a defendant after the right to counsel has attached, may be
deemed harmless under the Chapman rule.8 5 Shortly after Chapman was
84. In Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958), a case decided before the ad-
vent of the doctrine of harmless constitutional error, the Supreme Court held that a
conviction must be reversed when a coerced confession is introduced into evidence.
The Court has cited Payne with approval in several more recent decisions. See, e.g.,
Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508
n.6 (1983).
85. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). See infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the application of
Chapman to Miranda, lower federal courts have uniformly held that Miranda violations
may constitute harmless error. See supra note 32. They have been almost equally uni-
form in their failure to articulate any substantial reasons in support of this result. See,
e.g., Null v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.) (an automatic rule of reversal does
not apply because Chapman did not specifically exempt Miranda violations from harmless
error rule), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970 (1975). But cf. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428
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decided, the Court also held that the admission of a confession in viola-
tion of a defendant's right of confrontation may be harmless. 86
The Court has not attempted to resolve these tensions and has
consequently caused considerable confusion in the lower courts.87 The
Court's dictum supporting a rule of automatic reversal for coerced
confessions cannot be defended on the ground that a confession always
has a great impact on the jury.88 That rationale implies that, contrary
to the Court's decisions, a rule of automatic reversal is likewise
appropriate for confessions admitted in violation of.Massiah and the
Confrontation Clause. Nor can the dictum regarding coerced confes-
sions be justified by saying that their reliability is inherently suspect.89
The reliability of a confession made by a nontestifying codefendant ad-
mitted in violation of a defendant's right of confrontation is also sus-
pect, for the defendant lacks an opportunity to cross-examine the
codefendant and the codefendant has a clear incentive to minimize his
own involvement by casting primary blame on others. The Court thus
Pa. 229, 236, 237 A.2d 209, 212 (1968) (Miranda violations may be held harmless be-
cause they do not affect the reliability of the fact-finding process).
86. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
87. Although most courts have followed the Court's declarations that coerced con-
fessions are subject to an automatic rule of reversal, a few lower courts have applied the
Chapman rule. See United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 208-11 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138, 140-42 (7th Cir. 1982);
cf. State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 387, 724 P.2d 1, 6 (1986) (Assuming that defend-
ant's statement was coerced, "any error in failing to suppress the statement was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt."). These cases cite Milton for the proposition that
admission of an involuntary confession may be held harmless. In Milton, the defendant
contended that one of his four confessions was involuntary and obtained in violation of
his right to counsel. The Court assumed arguendo that the confession was inadmissible
but held that, in view of the three other validly obtained confessions, the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On its face, Milton does seem to hold implicitly
that admission of an involuntary confession may be harmless; otherwise, the Court
would have had to decide the merits of the defendant's involuntary confession claim to
uphold the conviction.
This reading of Milton, however, is inconsistent with the facts of that case, subse-
quent decisions of the Court and sound principles of constitutional decisionmaking. On
the facts of Milton, the involuntary confession claim was patently without merit: the de-
fendant had willingly confessed his role in the crime to a cellmate, who was in fact a
police officer. The only colorable constitutional objection to admission of the confes-
sion was based on the Massiah doctrine, which holds that police may not question a
defendant, surreptitiously or otherwise, once his right to counsel has attached. Milton,
then, is properly read as holding that a Massiah violation may be held harmless. Surely
the Court would not have overruled Payne without saying so and without giving any
reasons. It is noteworthy that subsequent Supreme Court decisiohs continue to cite
Payne approvingly. See supra note 84; cf. Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 674 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985) (distinguishing between true "coerced" confession from confession
obtained after violation of "police procedures"; only latter type of involuntary confes-
sion subject to Chapman rule), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1389 (1987).
88. See Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271, 278 (D.R.I. 1981); Mause, supra note
11, at 543-44.
89. See Padgett, 428 Pa. at 235-36, 237 A.2d at 212.
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has not articulated a convincing rationale for its repeated declarations
that the admission of a coerced confession requires automatic reversal.
This is probably because the right against coerced confessions does not
fit into the Court's truth-furthering model of harmless error
jurisprudence.90
A number of purposes have been attributed to the right against
coerced confessions and the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination from which it derives. Judicial opinions and commentators
variously assert that these protections seek to preserve a sphere of
mental privacy, 91 to prevent law enforcement officials from using abu-
sive tactics, 92 and to save the accused from cruelty and humiliation.9 3
Viewed in light of any of these purposes, the harm wrought by coercing
a confession cannot be undone by redoing the judicial process. A new
trial cannot restore a loss of privacy, undo abusive conduct or erase
humiliation felt by the accused at the time of the coercion.
The remedial rule must therefore be concerned with deterring fu-
ture violations rather than with curing the incurable harm that has al-
ready occurred. Furthermore, violations of the right against coerced
confessions do not go undetected; the defendant necessarily witnesses
them. Under the approach proposed here, the Chapman harmless error
rule, which ensures that law enforcement officials do not benefit from
constitutional error and embraces the modest deterrent of requiring a
retrial when the error has influenced the result, is sufficient.
Although the purposes described above are those most frequently
attributed to the right against coerced confessions and the privilege
against self-incrimination, scattered references to other purposes can
also be found. It is sometimes said that these protections are truth-
furthering, that they reflect doubts concerning the reliability of invol-
untary confessions. 94 Because the purpose of a truth-furthering right is
90. See Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1986) (Exclusion of an involun-
tary confession withholds relevant evidence: " '[t]he aim of the requirement of due pro-
cess is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' ") (quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
91. See, e.g., Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (the privilege reflects "the
concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone"); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privilege reflects "our respect for the invi-
olability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life' ") (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
581-82 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)); see also Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1066 n.19 (1986) (citing
authority).
92. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (purpose of prohibition
against involuntary confessions is to curb police conduct that is " 'revolting to the sense
ofjustice' ") (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)).
93. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 91, at 1066 n.18 (citing authority).
94. See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (privilege reflects "our distrust of self-depreca-
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not impaired when a violation does not affect the outcome, the Chapman
rule generally protects the right's purpose.
Although violation of a truth-furthering right must be subject to
automatic reversal when one cannot be confident that a particular type
of violation has not affected the outcome, this exception would not ap-
ply in the context of coerced confessions. It is true that the Court has
suggested that a jury will inevitably be affected by incriminating words
from a defendant's own mouth.95 This suggestion, however, is incon-
sistent with the Court's holdings that a confession obtained in violation
of the Massiah doctrine or of a defendant's right of confrontation may
be held harmless under Chapman. In Milton v. Wainwright,9 6 for in-
stance, the Court held that a confession obtained in violation of Massiah
was harmless in view of three other properly admitted confessions con-
taining much the same information. Milton illustrates that a court
sometimes can be confident that an improperly admitted confession
could have had no reasonable impact on the verdict. The confession
may be cumulative as a matter of law, as in Milton, for the remaining
evidence may be so strong that any rational jury would be compelled to
convict. Consequently, even if the right against coerced confessions is
seen as a truth-furthering right, the Chapman rule is appropriate.
Finally, some authorities say that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation implements "our sense of fair play which dictates a 'fair state-
individual balance .... , -97 If the purpose of the privilege is conceived
as protecting a truth-neutral value in fair play, an automatic rule of re-
versal is appropriate. The harm caused by the violation-the skewed
balance between the state and the accused-would be cured by a new
trial at which the confession and its fruits are excluded. Because the
value in fair play is not concerned with reliability, the conviction should
be reversed and process redone even when the defendant is undeniably
guilty and we are fully confident that the confession did not affect the
jury's verdict.
The right against coerced confession illustrates the importance of
identifying the nature of the values inhering in particular constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court has simply asserted in conclusory fashion
that a rule of automatic reversal should apply to errors involving this
right because the right is among those rights "so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,"98 without con-
sidering whether the right's purposes require such a remedy.
tory statements"); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure:
Cases, Comments and Questions 553-57 (5th ed. 1980).
95. SeeJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 383 (1964).
96. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
97. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8J. Wigmore, Evidence 317 U. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961)).
98. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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c. Fourth Amendment Rights. - The Court has adopted the Chapman
test for fourth amendment violations, but has not justified this result.99
The fourth amendment protects truth-impairing privacy interests
against unreasonable governmental intrusion. 100 Once an unlawful in-
vasion of privacy has occurred, however, a court cannot restore the loss
of privacy by ordering a new trial at which the unconstitutionally seized
evidence is excluded.' 0 ' Because it cannot redress the wrong in the
case before it, a court can only seek to prevent future unconstitutional
searches and seizures.
The Chapman rule adequately deters future violations of the fourth
amendment. By reversing the conviction when there is a reasonable
chance that illegally obtained evidence influenced the outcome, the
rule eliminates any incentive for law enforcement officials to violate the
fourth amendment. The remedial rule need not create strong disincen-
tives to compensate for a significant risk of nondetection because there
is no such risk in the context of fourth amendment violations. The
existence of the illegally seized evidence alerts the defense to the viola-
tion. The mild sanction created by the Chapman rule would seem suffi-
cient to deter.
The Chapman rule is also consistent with the level of deterrence
contemplated by the exclusionary rule. If courts wished to maximize
deterrence of fourth amendment violations, they would erect a com-
plete bar to prosecution when law enforcement authorities have vio-
lated a defendant's fourth amendment rights. Courts, of course, do not
resort to this extreme sanction. In deference to the government's in-
terest in prosecuting crime, they merely exclude evidence obtained
through the fourth amendment violation. Rather than maximizing de-
terrence, the exclusionary rule is designed to do no more than elimi-
nate incentives to violate the Constitution.' 0 2
The Chapman rule likewise removes any incentive to use illegally
seized evidence and may well create modest disincentives. Thus, if the
exclusionary rule adequately protects the interest in individual privacy
99. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970); see also Rose v. Clark,
106 S. Ct. 3101, 3105 (1986) (citing Chambers for proposition that fourth amendment
violations are subject to the Chapman rule).
100. E.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987) (" 'There is nothing new
in the realization that [the fourth amendment] sometimes insulates the criminality of a
few in order to protect the privacy of us all.").
101. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) (" 'The [exclusionary]
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incen-
tive to disregard it.' ") (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (em-
phasis added).
102. Kamisar, Police Practice Phases, supra note 5, at 270 n.87 ("Despite the popu-
larity of the 'deterrence' terminology, it seems more accurate and useful to call the ex-
clusionary rule a 'counterweight' within the criminal justice system or a "disincentive'-a
means of eliminating significant incentives for making illegal searches ... ").
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that underlies the fourth amendment, the Chapman harmless error rule
does so as well.
2. Truth-Furthering Rights.
a. The Right to Obtain Exculpatory Evidence in the Prosecutor's Possession.
- In Brady v. Maryland,103 the Court held that a prosecutor has a con-
stitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in his possession. 10 4
In subsequent cases, the Court has held that a defendant's conviction
need not be reversed unless the undisclosed evidence creates a "rea-
sonable probability" of a different outcome.10 5
At first blush, the Court would seem to be correct in requiring that
a conviction be upheld when the undisclosed evidence could not rea-
sonably have influenced the outcome. Because the Brady right is
quintessentially truth furthering, its purpose is not infringed unless the
undisclosed evidence may have affected the outcome of the criminal
trial. 106 Further, unlike the outright denial of counsel, the effect of a
Brady error is not inherently difficult for a reviewing court to evaluate.
A court will have all of the evidence presented at trial before it, and can
consider its relationship to the undisclosed evidence. 10 7
This analysis, however, overlooks the need to deter Brady viola-
tions. Because the facts establishing a Brady violation are exclusively
within a prosecutor's possession, they are easily concealed from the de-
fense. It is therefore likely that a significant share of constitutional er-
rors involving the Brady right, whether intentional or negligent, are
never uncovered. Unless courts impose an overbroad remedy when
103. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
104. In particular, the Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87.
105. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (the omitted evidence must create a reasonable doubt that does not
otherwise exist). These cases use an impact-on-the-outcome standard as a prejudice
requirement to define the existence of the right itself rather than as a harmless error rule
to decide the availability of a remedy. There is a close relationship between an outcome-
oriented prejudice requirement and the Chapman harmless error rule; indeed, the
Chapman harmless error rule can be restated as a prejudice requirement. See Bagley, 473
U.S. at 678; Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1014 n.88. From the perspective of an appel-
late court, it makes no difference whether an impact-on-the-outcome standard is used as
a prejudice requirement or as a harmless error rule. Under both rules, it will uphold the
conviction unless the asserted violation had the requisite impact on the outcome.
For a discussion of whether courts should use an impact-on-the-outcome standard
as a prejudice requirement, see infra notes 155-84 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
107. For an argument that a reviewing court cannot accurately assess the impact of
undisclosed evidence, see Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Aguis
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 Fordham L. Rev.
391, 396 (1984). The Supreme Court has rejected this argument. Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682-83.
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they discover a violation, prosecutors will likely consider the benefits of
such a violation-the enhanced likelihood of a conviction-to outweigh
the likely costs of noncompliance with the Brady duty. Because prose-
cutors would never face reversal of a conviction they could have ob-
tained without a Brady violation and because of the chance that a
violation producing needed evidence will go undetected, the Chapman
rule will not by itself create sufficient disincentives. Nor will a rule of
automatic reversal add significantly to the disincentive. When the pros-
ecutor decides whether to comply with Brady, he is generally well aware
of the nature and strength of his evidence and knows whether his case
is so strong that it can withstand the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
If it can, he has no reason to violate his Brady obligations. If it might
not, his choice to enhance the possibility of conviction by violating
Brady is influenced by the same disincentives under both the Chapman
rule and the rule of automatic reversal: he will be reversed if caught.108
This discussion illustrates one of the consequences of the Court's
failure to develop a coherent theory of harmless error. Because the
Court has not recognized the independent significance of deterrence in
the law of harmless error, it has adopted remedial rules that do not
adequately deter Brady violations. This should be of great concern to
the Court if it is serious about its rhetoric concerning the importance of
factual reliability, for Brady directly implicates the reliability of the de-
termination of guilt.
b. The Right to Counsel. - Although the Court has often treated the
right to counsel as only a truth-furthering right,10 9 it has not adopted
the Chapman harmless error rule with respect to all aspects of the right.
The Court has distinguished between cases involving outright denial of
counsel and counsel whose performance is adversely affected by an ac-
tual conflict of interest, on one hand, and cases involving all other kinds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, on the other. A rule of automatic
reversal applies in the former situations;"I 0 an outcome-oriented preju-
108. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 691-92 (1984); United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct.
2574, 2586 (1986) ("we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the
determination of actual guilt"); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984)
(defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his choice may embody values other
than "concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding"); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself even though
self-representation generally impairs the reliability of the result). For a discussion of
Farella, see infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
Because "it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights,"
Kimmelman, 106 S. Ct. at 2584, the view that the right to counsel has only truth-further-
ing purposes seems plainly wrong. The right, in part, is intended to secure other rights
having non-truth-furthering purposes.
110. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (attorney whose performance
is adversely affected by actual conflict of interest); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
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dice test that is analogous to the Chapman rule in the latter."I'
The Court has never provided a satisfactory explanation for these
distinctions," 12 and lower courts have been uncertain as to what the
Court's right-to-counsel decisions imply with respect to errors involv-
ing certain aspects of the right to counsel. In particular, lower courts
have divided over whether to treat orders denying a defendant the right
to consult with his counsel for a brief period during trial as reversible
per se or as subject to the Chapman rule." 3
Accepting for a moment the view that the right to counsel is
designed only to promote reliability, the theory proposed here suggests
that the Chapman rule is the appropriate remedy for errors involving
that right unless it is inherently difficult to show that a violation of the
right affected the outcome. This difficulty exists when a defendant has
been denied counsel altogether. A court is unable to evaluate the effect
that the denial of counsel has had on the outcome because it lacks the
information necessary to form an intelligentjudgment: the record does
not contain evidence and argument that an attorney would have devel-
oped. Yet this logic also applies when defense counsel was constitu-
345 (1963) (complete denial of counsel), cited with approval in Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct.
3101, 3106 (1986).
111. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Under this prejudice requirement, the defendant
must show that but for his attorney's objectively unreasonable performance there is a
"reasonable probability" the result would have been different. Id. at 694. "A reason-
able probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
112. The Court has suggested that automatic reversal is appropriate in "circum-
stances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in
a particular case is unjustified." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658; accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at
692. The likelihood of prejudice, however, does not differentiate the situation in which
defense counsel has unreasonably failed to investigate possible defenses, where the
Court requires the defendant to show outcome-influencing prejudice, from situations
involving denial of counsel altogether or counsel suffering from an actual conflict of
interest, where prejudice is presumed and a rule of automatic reversal applies. The
mere physical presence of an attorney who does nothing to develop and support possi-
ble defenses does not magically reduce the likelihood of prejudice. Cf. Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (physical presence of attorney suffering from an
actual conflict of interest does not justify departure from rule of presumed prejudice).
113. In Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
an order prohibiting counsel from conferring with the defendant during an overnight
recess violated the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel. Geders has been interpreted
as adopting a rule of automatic reversal for such violations. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659
n.25; Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Courts disagree
about whether the conviction must also be reversed automatically when a court has pre-
cluded the defendant from consulting with his attorney during a brief recess. Compare
Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (adopting rule of
automatic reversal), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3235 (1987) with United States v. DiLapi,
651 F.2d 140, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendant required to show outcome was af-
fected), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) and State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 490-95, 299
S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983); cf. Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d
1257, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1987) (divided panel) (rule of automatic reversal applies when
counsel has not attended part of trial).
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tionally ineffective in failing to investigate the case, 114 a situation in
which the Court has demanded that a defendant satisfy an outcome-
oriented prejudice requirement. 115 Under our theory, a rule of auto-
matic reversal is appropriate in both situations.
In contrast, it is easier for a court to evaluate whether an actual
conflict of interest that has adversely affected counsel's representation
may reasonably have affected the outcome. Given the discretionary and
multifaceted nature of the judgments attorneys routinely make and the
impossibility of assigning precise and unitary motives to these complex
judgments, the real difficulty would seem to lie in showing that a con-
flict has adversely affected the attorney's performance. Indeed, the Court
has declared that it "would be virtually impossible" to "assess the
impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and
decisions." 116 The Court, however, rather anomalously requires a de-
fendant to show that the conflict adversely affected his attorney's per-
formance and relieves him only of the burden of proving that the
conflict could have influenced the outcome.' 17 But once a defendant
has isolated how an actual conflict has adversely affected his attorney's
performance, it should not be so difficult for him to articulate, and a
court to evaluate, the impact of the conflicted representation on the
outcome that a rule of automatic reversal must be used. This is not to
suggest that it is fair to require a defendant to show adverse effect on
performance. Rather, the point is that if this showing is required, it
makes little sense to presume conclusively that this adversely affected
performance influenced the outcome.
If one views the right to counsel solely as a truth-furthering right,
rule of automatic reversal is clearly unjustified when a court has errone-
ously ordered a defendant not to consult with his attorney for a brief
period during trial. Because the defendant and his counsel can inform
the court of what they would have discussed, 1 8 it should be relatively
easy for courts to evaluate the possible impact of the order on the out-
114. See Cornell Note, supra note 11, at 557.
115. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
116. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491.
117. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the Court held that "[i]n order to
demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 350.
This standard requires more than just a showing of how the conflict might have affected
the attorney's performance; it requires that a defendant establish how that performance
actually was adversely affected by the conflict.
118. One court reasoned that requiring a defendant to show how the order
prejudiced him "would create an unacceptable risk of infringing on the attorney-client
privilege." Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Supreme
Court has implicitly rejected this reasoning. A defendant may be forced to reveal privi-
leged communications to establish that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective
under the Strickland standard or that his attorney's performance was adversely affected
by an actual conflict of interest, as required by Cuyler. See supra notes 110-11 and ac-
companying text.
1988]
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come. This suggests that those lower courts applying the Chapman rule
rather than a rule of automatic reversal to this particular constitutional
error have reached the better result.I 19
c. The Right to Present Evidence. - The right to present evidence
120
encompasses a number of constituent rights, including the rights of a
defendant to confront adverse witnesses,121 to attend the trial, 122 to
testify on his own behalf,123 to be represented effectively by counsel'
24
and to compel the attendance of favorable witnesses.' 2 5 The Supreme
Court has said that the purpose of these rights is to ensure the reliabil-
ity of guilty verdicts.' 26 Except in a few situations relating to the right
to counsel, 127 it has held that violations of these rights may be held
harmless.
128
119. If the right to counsel also has truth-neutral purposes the Chapman rule may
not be appropriate. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
120. In the leading case of Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the Supreme
Court described the right to present evidence, often called the right to present a de-
fense, as follows:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law.
Id. at 19; see also Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986). See generally
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713 (1976); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Pro-
cess: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1978);
Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 Mich. L. Rev, 191 (1975); Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1974) [hereinafter Compulsory Process I].
121. U.S. Const. amend. VI; e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974).
122. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
123. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708-10 (1987).
124. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
125. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
126. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) ("[E]xclusion of
this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the
prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial test-
ing.' ") (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
127. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
128. Crane, 106 S. Ct. at 2147 (remanding to state court for harmless error determi-
nation); Delaware v. Van Arsdal, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986) (violation of confronta-
tion clause may be held harmless under the Chapman rule); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
114, 117-18 (1983) (per curiam) (denial of right to be present at trial subject to Chapman
rule). Regarding some aspects of the right to present a defense, the Court has imposed
an analogous prejudice requirement to define the very existence of the right in question.
See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1002 (1987) (discovery rights); United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (same); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (right to effective
assistance of counsel); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982)
(right to interview witnesses deported by the government). This standard requires that
the defendant establish that the evidence he seeks creates a "reasonable probability" of
a more favorable outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. For a discussion of the relationship
[Vol. 88:79
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 110 1988
HARMLESS ERROR
If the Court's view of these rights' purpose is correct, it has prop-
erly chosen to apply the Chapman harmless error rule rather than a rule
of automatic reversal. The preconditions for application of the
Chapman rule are all present: an outcome-oriented rule accurately
gauges whether an error has impaired the purpose of the right; it is not
inherently difficult to determine in a particular case whether an error
may have affected the outcome; and redoing the adjudicative process
can cure the harm caused by the error.
129
The flaw in the Court's analysis is that it adopts too narrow a view
of the purposes of the rights constituting the right to present evidence.
Certainly these rights are archetypal truth-furthering rights: they di-
rectly contribute to the reliability of the outcome. One can argue, how-
ever, that they also incorporate a truth-neutral value in affording the
defendant his day in court.
The Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California 13 0 supports
the notion that the right to present evidence incorporates a truth-neu-
tral value of participation. In Faretta, the Court held that a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself if he so
chooses. The Court found the right of self-representation to be im-
plicit in the sixth amendment's "statement of the rights necessary to a
full defense," which includes the rights to counsel, to confront adverse
witnesses and to compel the testimony of favorable witnesses. 3 1 As
the Court itself recognized, the right to self-representation cannot be
explained in terms of truth-furthering values; a defendant's assertion of
the right will generally impede the search for the truth.' 3 2 Rather,
between the Chapman rule and prejudice tests, see infra notes 155-84 and accompanying
text.
129. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
130. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
131. Id. at 818.
132. Id. at 832-34. In Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984), the Court
suggested that the "right [to counsel of choice] reflects constitutional protection of the
defendant's free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding." Id. at
267-68 (emphasis added). It reasoned that, as with the denial of the defendant's right
to represent himself, a rule of automatic reversal may be required to protect the non-
truth-furthering values protected by the right. Id.; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (suggesting, in dictum, that the right of self-representation may
not be held harmless because it protects values unrelated to truth determination).
Federal appellate courts have adopted Flanagan's suggestion, holding that the de-
nial of a defendant's right to counsel of choice requires reversal of the conviction re-
gardless of whether the outcome was thereby affected. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d
10, 16 (1st Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985); see also
Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216-19 (2d Cir. 1986) (denial of right of self-represen-
tation may not be held harmless) (citing cases).
The Supreme Court's suggestions in Flanagan, which are logically implied by
Faretta, are difficult to reconcile with the Court's other right to counsel decisions. If the
sixth amendment implies a right to counsel of choice that embraces non-truth-furthering
values, it would seem that other aspects of the right to counsel should be interpreted in
light of these same values. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
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the right exists in large part to "affirm the dignity and autonomy of the
accused"' 1 3  by giving him a measure of control over the
proceedings.'
3"
Because the right of self-representation derives from the various
rights forming the right to a full defense, Faretta necessarily implies that
the same truth-neutral value also underlies the parent rights. Indeed,
the Court's decision in Faretta implies that the truth-neutral value in
participation underlying the right to present evidence outweighs that
right's truth-furthering value when the two values conflict. For if the
truth-furthering value predominated, the right of self-representation
would be acknowledged only when a court could be sure that it would
not impede the search for the truth. Faretta, however, holds that the
right of self-representation exists despite its truth-impairing effects.
But even beyond Faretta, each of the various rights constituting the
right to present evidence-the rights to counsel, to confront adverse
witnesses, to compulsory process, to testify and to attend trial-itself
enables a criminal defendant to participate in the proceedings against
him. Rather than existing as an unintentional by-product of these vari-
ous rights' truth-furthering purpose, this participatory or dignitary
function may be seen to have a constitutional significance of its own.
Although the specific nature of the value of participation may be
difficult to define, at a minimum it bestows a certain dignity on all de-
fendants. The Constitution rightly treats the accused as a person wor-
thy of respect. Consequently, a defendant is entitled to have his voice
heard in the proceedings in which his fate is decided, even if he has no
reasonable chance of swaying a jury. Just as a citizen holding views that
have no hope of prevailing has a right to participate in the political
process, so also does an undeniably guilty criminal defendant have a
right to participate in his criminal trial. Wholly apart from its effect on
the truth-determining process, participation serves to "generat[e] the
feeling, so important to popular government, that justice has been
done."135
Despite pervasive indications that the right to present evidence has
truth-neutral as well as truth-furthering purposes, the Court's approach
to errors involving the right, by focusing only on the truth-furthering
values protected by the harmless error rule, blinds it to the right's
truth-neutral values. This oversight is regrettable, for the Chapman test
does not adequately protect the truth-neutral value in participation.' 36
133. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77.
134. Id. at 174.
135. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-64 (1978)
(procedural due process serves a participatory function that is independent of its truth-
determining function); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 636 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (same).
136. The Court has itself recognized that the Chapman rule does not adequately
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An asserted constitutional error may have prevented the defendant
from meaningful participation in the criminal process even though the
outcome was not thereby affected. The truth-neutral value in participa-
tion does not necessarily mean that a harmless error rule must be re-
jected altogether. It does mean, however, that a harmless error rule
must be framed so as to give truth-neutral values their due. Because a
new trial can vindicate the right's participatory purpose, one must be
granted despite the soundness of the conviction whenever that purpose
has been frustrated.
d. Right to a Public Trial. - In Waller v. Georgia,'37 the Supreme
Court held that a Georgia court violated the defendant's qualified sixth
amendment right to a public trial by excluding the public from a
lengthy suppression hearing. Although the purposes of the right iden-
tified by the Court were all truth furthering, the Court adopted a rule of
automatic reversal of sorts. In a brief paragraph addressing the issue of
the appropriate remedy, the Court declined to vacate the defendant's
conviction, but it did require the trial court to hold another suppression
hearing.' 3 8 It squarely rejected the Chapman rule, which would have
required a new suppression hearing only if closure affected the court's
decision to admit the challenged evidence.'
3 9
Although the Chapman rule should be presumptively appropriate
for rights having only truth-furthering purposes, automatic reversal is
appropriate when it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate the effect of the
type of error in question on the outcome. Violations of the right to a
public trial generally fit into this exceptional class of truth-furthering
rights. The right to a public trial is designed in part to discourage per-
jury and to encourage witnesses to come forward.' 40 A court would
have to engage in unguided speculation to conclude that the nonpublic
nature of the proceeding had no effect on the witnesses' testimony or
on which witnesses came forward to testify. The very nature of "the
benefits of a public trial" is that they are "frequently intangible, difficult
to prove, or a matter of chance." 14 1 Due to the difficulty of evaluating
the effect of a nonpublic proceeding on the outcome, a rule of auto-
matic reversal is thus generally appropriate.' 42
protect the participatory value underlying the right to self-representation. McKaskle, 465
U.S. at 177 n.8.
137. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
138. Id. at 49-50.
139. Id. at 49 n.9.
140. Id. at 46.
141. Id. at 49 n.9.
142. Our approach suggests two narrow exceptions to the general approach requir-
ing automatic reversal. The first exists when disputed issues of fact are not relevant to
any decisions made in the dosed proceeding; the second when a defendant has con-
tested in a closed proceeding the credibility of a government witness who later repeats
the same testimony at an open hearing (such as at trial). In the first situation, courts can
be confident that closure did not impair the truth-furthering values underlying the right.
19881
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The per se rule utilized in Waller can also be justified if the right is
seen in part to enable a defendant to air publicly his complaints about
the government and society and in part to project an image of legiti-
macy and impartial justice. If these are indeed two purposes of the
right, then in denying the defendant the intended public forum, the
trial court has failed to promote them. Redoing the trial can restore the
losses caused by the violation and vindicate the purpose of the right.
e. Right to an Impartial Tribunal. - The Supreme Court has charac-
terized the right to an impartial tribunal as a basic right whose denial
requires reversal. 143 The approach suggested here, 144 however, im-
plies that the Court's dictum concerning the appropriate remedy for
error involving this right is correct only if the right is seen to embody
non-truth-furthering purposes.
If the right to an impartial tribunal is viewed solely as a truth-fur-
thering right, 145 the use of an automatic reversal rule is unjustified.
The Chapman rule must be used for errors involving rights having only
-truth-furthering purposes unless, first, it is inherently difficult to ascer-
tain in particular cases whether this type of violation has affected the
outcome or, second, the remedial rule must compensate for a signifi-
cant risk that errors of this sort escape detection. The right to an im-
partial tribunal fits within neither exception.
Language in the Court's opinions suggests that a rule of automatic
reversal is appropriate because one can never know whether the biases
of a judge or a juror have influenced the outcome of a particular
case.' 46 Yet, though it may be impossible for a defendant to prove that
partiality did affect the outcome, the prosecutor can in many cases
prove that the violation did not affect the outcome. Unlike denial of the
right to counsel, a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal does
not unduly restrict the evidence that is available to a reviewing court. A
Because no facts are in dispute, there are no witnesses to encourage to come forward
and no perjury relevant to the proceedings to discourage. The second situation is more
complex. Although closure of the first hearing might have had an impact on the truth-
fulness of the witness' testimony, he has already repeated his testimony in a public pro-
ceeding and there would be no point in requiring that he do so yet again.
143. The Court has said repeatedly that a violation of the right to an impartial tri-
bunal may never be declared harmless. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106
(1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 & n.6 (1983). In Gray v. Mississippi,
107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987), the Court held squarely that the erroneous exclusion for cause
of a "death qualified" juror from a sentencing jury that imposed the death penalty is
subject to a rule of automatic reversal. Id. at 2056. A four Justice plurality viewed the
right in question as an aspect of the right to an impartial jury, which "goes to the very
integrity of the legal system" and as to which "the Chapman harmless error analysis can-
not apply." Id.
144. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
145. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1982) (Marshall, Brennan,
Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (right to an impartial jury aimed at ensuring reliable determina-
tion of guilt). But see infra note 150 and accompanying text.
146. Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3107 n.7.
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reviewing court has all of the evidence and argument an impartial deci-
sionmaker would have had before it. It is true that a court' has no relia-
ble means of determining whether the particular jury or judge was
influenced by partiality. But a court should nevertheless be able to dis-
cern when any rational decisionmaker would have been compelled to
convict. If a rational decisionmaker would have been so compelled, the
reviewing court can conclude that the error was harmless. The diffi-
culty of showing that a violation has affected the outcome does not ne-
cessitate rejection of the Chapman rule; it merely requires that the
prosecution bear the burden of demonstrating that the error did not
undermine the reliability of the result.
147
Considerations of deterrence do not require a rule of automatic
reversal. The right to an impartial tribunal is most often infringed be-
cause jurors do not adequately disclose the facts indicating their possi-
ble biases. Even assuming that the risk of nondetection is sufficient to
implicate a concern for deterrence, a rule that vacates the conviction or
bars reprosecution will have no impact whatsoever on jurors. Unlike
law enforcement officials and "compliant" judges, 148 jurors have no
personal or professional stake in convicting a defendant or avoiding
reversal and retrial. As for those errors involving judicial partiality, the
risk of nondetection is probably insufficient to justify a deterrence-
based rule. Judges usually do not conceal the facts that give rise to the
claim of partiality; it is the legal consequences of those facts that are in
question.
One might object to the foregoing analysis on the ground that the
right to an impartial tribunal fosters the appearance as well as the real-
ity of a reliable result. This argument, however, does not justify appli-
cation of a per se rule of reversal. If a rational decisionmaker would
have been compelled to convict, a reasonable appearance of an unrelia-
ble result simply does not exist.149
The only truly substantial objection to using the Chapman rule is
that the purposes of the right to an impartial tribunal extend beyond
that of promoting the reliability of the determination of guilt. Under
this view, the right to an impartial tribunal exists because otherwise the
judicial process would offend the dignity of the accused and society's
sense of fair play.' 50 If the right to an impartial tribunal incorporates
147. Admittedly, permitting a court to uphold a conviction when a rational jury
would have been compelled to convict ostensibly conflicts with the prohibition against
directed guilty verdicts and its underlying policy of permitting the jury to nullify the law.
The Chapman rule can be formulated, however, in a manner that is consistent with the
concept ofjury nullification. See infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
148. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
149. See supra note 43.
150. The cases furnish some support for this view of the right's purposes. See Gray
v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2057 (1987) (right to impartial jury is in part a "right not
to have [one's] culpability determined by a 'tribunal "organized to convict."' ") (quot-
ing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968)); Marshall v.Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
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such truth-neutral values, the approach suggested here requires a rule
of automatic reversal, though not for the reasons the Court has ad-
vanced. These values may be frustrated even though we can be confi-
dent of the defendant's guilt. Because redoing the judicial process can
effectuate the right's purposes of fostering individual dignity and en-
suring fair play, these purposes require that the conviction be set aside
and the process redone. 151
f. Due Process Right to a Jury Instruction on Each Element of the Offense.
Lower courts have divided on whether a trial court's failure to in-
struct the jury on an element of the crime may be deemed harmless. 152
238, 242 (1980) (right exists, in part, to promote "participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decisionmaking process"); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,
466 (1971) (vacating defendant's convictions for contempt even though Court viewed
acquittal as inconceivable).
151. It should be noted that the right to an impartial jury may have truth-neutral
purposes that are not shared by the right to an impartial judge. Unlike judges, jurors
are not expected to be entirely rational agents who find facts and apply the law to the
facts with antiseptic precision. One of the purposes of the right to ajury trial is to bring
ordinary laypersons' sense ofjustice to bear on the case. Juror partiality may interfere
with this function of the jury, which is frequently referred to as jury nullification. For the
relationship between the Chapman rule and jury nullification, and an argument that the
two are not necessarily inconsistent, see infra notes 220-35. The result in Gray, 107 S.
Ct. at 2045, may reflect similar concerns.
152. Compare Hoover v. Garfield Heights Mun. Ct., 802 F.2d 168, 177 (6th Cir.
1986) (failure to instructjury on essential element of the offense not subject to harmless
error rule), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1610 (1987) with Redding v. Benson, 739 F.2d 1360
(8th Cir. 1984) (failure to instruct jury on essential element of offense may be held
harmless), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1222 (1985). The Supreme Court's decision in Rose v.
Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986), sent conflicting signals as to the proper resolution of this
issue. In Rose, the Court had held that a jury instruction that unconstitutionally shifts
the burden of persuasion from the prosecution to the accused on a material element of
the offense may be held harmless. In dictum, however, the Court declared that "harm-
less-error analysis presumably would not apply if a court directed a verdict for the prose-
cution in a criminal trial by jury." Id. at 3106. In Hoover, a divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that a complete failure to instruct the jury on a material element of the
offense is akin to a directed verdict on that issue. Hoover, 802 F.2d at 177-78. The
dissent found the failure to instruct more analogous to the instructional error at issue in
Rose. Id. at 180.
In Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987), the Supreme Court resolved a related
issue involving a failure to instruct the jury properly on an element of the crime. In a
prosecution for distribution of obscene materials, the jury was told- erroneously, ac-
cording to the Court-to consider the social value of the allegedly obscene materials
under prevailing community standards rather than the standard of "a reasonable per-
son." Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921. The instruction itself amounted to constitutional error
because it did not properly reflect the first amendment's definition of unprotected ob-
scene materials. The Court, in an opinion joined by five justices, held that although the
instruction on this element of the offense was in error, the error could be deemed harm-
less if no properly instructed rational juror could have found in the defendant's favor on
this element. The Court's opinion, however, was careful to note that the jurors "were
not precluded from considering the question of value," Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1922, and
thus does not reach cases in which the jury has not received any instruction at all on an
element of the offense. The four dissenting Justices thought that the Chapman rule
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Under the approach suggested here, the Chapman rule is presumptively
appropriate for such rights. The purpose of the due process right to
have the jury instructed that it must find each element of the charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is truth furthering in nature. More-
over, the considerations that justify use of a rule of automatic reversal
for truth-furthering rights do not apply to this particular right.
First, it is not difficult for a court to ascertain that a failure to in-
struct on a material element could have had no reasonable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding. The error does not affect the composition
of the record, and the court can determine whether the evidence as to
the element was so compelling that any rational jury would find its
existence beyond a reasonble doubt.1 53 Although permitting a court to
make this determination is ostensibly inconsistent with the prohibition
against directed guilty verdicts, the Chapman rule can be formulated in a
manner that is consistent with this prohibition.1 54 Second, considera-
tions of deterrence do not require automatic reversal. Because the fail-
ure to instruct occurs in the presence of the defendant and his counsel,
the remedial rule need not compensate for a significant risk of
nondetection.
III. DEFINING RIGHTS AT TRIAL: THE LIMITATIONS OF AN
IMPACT-ON-THE-OUTCOME PREJUDICE TEST
In defining the parameters of those rights composing a defendant's
constitutional right to obtain and present evidence, 155 courts have used
rules focusing on outcomes in two different ways. 156 They have
adopted an outcome-oriented prejudice test at trial to trigger the very
existence of some rights. For example, the government has a constitu-
tional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense only if
the evidence in question creates a reasonable probability of an outcome
more favorable to the defense. In contrast, courts have defined other
rights at trial less strictly, confining an impact-on-the-outcome standard
should not apply in any circumstances to a failure to instruct the jury properly on the
elements of the offense. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See, e.g., Redding, 739 F.2d at 1363 (although court failed to inform the jury
that to convict the defendant of the charged theft it was required to find that he had
stolen property worth more than $1,000, the property he allegedly had stolen was indis-
putably worth $12,000).
154. See infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
155. Although the rights composing the right to obtain and present evidence
should be recognized to have, in part, a truth-neutral function, see supra notes 120-36
and accompanying text, the Supreme Court largely treats these rights as having only a
truth-furthering function and has applied impact-on-the-outcome standards to alleged
constitutional errors. This Part, by criticizing the Court's choice between two impact-
on-the-outcome standards, can be seen as an additional criticism.
156. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80 (1985) (noting that the
Chapman test, a remedial rule, can easily be translated into a definitional rule as a preju-
dice requirement); Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 1014 n.88 (same).
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to a harmless error rule used on appeal or collateral review. To estab-
lish at trial a constitutional, right to cross-examine a government wit-
ness for bias, for example, a defendant ordinarily need not show that
the cross-examination may reasonably affect the outcome in his favor.
The "prejudice" necessary to trigger the existence of the right at trial
exists when the cross-examination may elicit evidence from a govern-
ment witness tending to show bias. Whether the cross-examination
may have affected the outcome comes into play only on appeal or in a
habeas proceeding when a reviewing court determines whether an erro-
neous restriction of the right is harmless under Chapman. Thus, the
difference between these two approaches is that one uses an impact-on-
the-outcome standard at trial to determine the existence of a given
right while the other employs a more relaxed test at trial, using an im-
pact-on-the-outcome standard only as a post-trial harmless error rule.
On appeal or in a habeas corpus proceeding, little turns on the
choice between these two uses of an impact-on-the-outcome stan-
dard.' 57 If, for instance, a defendant has been denied a requested op-
portunity to cross-examine a witness for bias but the cross-examination
had no reasonable chance of affecting the outcome, and the existence
of the right to cross-examine were to depend on its effect on the out-
come, an appellate or habeas court would uphold the conviction on the
ground that no constitutional violation had occurred. If, as existing law
does provide, a lesser prejudice test defines the right, subject to post-
trial harmless error review, then an appellate or habeas court would
conclude that a constitutional violation had occurred but would still up-
hold the conviction on the ground that the violation was harmless.
Thus, for rights such as the right to effective assistance of counsel,
which is almost invariably raised for the first time on appeal or in
habeas corpus, the choice between a strict outcome-oriented prejudice
test and a more relaxed test subject to the Chapman harmless error rule
principally affects only the language a court uses in stating its conclu-
sion to uphold or invalidate the conviction, not the conclusion itself.
157. Note two differences. First, under existing law, the likelihood of an impact on
the outcome needed to satisfy the outcome-oriented prejudice test is greater than that
needed to demonstrate under Chapman that error is harmful. The outcome-oriented
prejudice test adopted by the Supreme Court requires a "reasonableprobabiliy" that the
evidence in question may affect the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).
The Chapman harmless error rule requires only a "reasonable possibility" that the evi-
dence in question may affect the outcome. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Chapman test is more favorable to a de-
fendant than the "reasonable probability of a different outcome" prejudice test. Bagley,
473 U.S. at 680-81.
Second, the outcome-oriented prejudice test and the Chapman rule impose the bur-
den of persuasion on different parties. The defendant bears the burden of convincing a
court that the outcome-oriented prejudice test is satisfied, Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 693 (1984), while the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the
harmlessness of error under Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. We do not address which party
should bear the burden of persuasion.
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In contrast, the choice has great significance for rights asserted at
trial. The lesser prejudice test permits a defendant to obtain and
present a greater range of evidence, by cross-examining prosecution
witnesses for bias, for instance, even though the witness adds nothing
of significance to the prosecution's case, the cross-examination would
not add anything to other evidence of bias already before the jury, or
the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that a rational jury would be
compelled to convict. Under an outcome-oriented prejudice test, how-
ever, a defendant would be denied any right to cross-examine the gov-
ernment witness.
The Supreme Court has used both approaches in defining the
rights to present evidence. It has held that a defendant must satisfy a
prejudice test phrased in terms of likely impact on the outcome to es-
tablish a violation of his constitutional rights to effective assistance of
counsel, 158 to obtain exculpatory evidence in the government's posses-
sion' 59 and to interview alien witnesses whom the government has de-
ported. 160 In each of these situations, a defendant can establish
constitutional error only by showing that compliance with the asserted
right would create a "reasonable probability" of an acquittal or convic-
tion on a lesser charge.
In contrast, the Court recently held that a defendant ordinarily
need not show outcome-influencing prejudice to establish violations of
the rights to cross-examine government witnesses for bias161 and to
elicit favorable testimony from his own witnesses. 162 For these rights, a
showing of a possible or likely impact on the outcome becomes relevant
only after the trial when an appellate or a habeas court applies the
Chapman test to decide whether the constitutional error was harmful.
Yet the Court has not articulated a convincing rationale for distin-
guishing when courts ought to define a right to obtain or present evi-
dence at trial in terms of a strict outcome-oriented prejudice test from
when they ought to use a lesser prejudice test, subject to post-trial
harmless error review. The Court has attempted to justify using a
lesser prejudice test in only one case, Delaware v. Van Arsdall.163 The
Court reasoned that the language of the confrontation clause' 64 fore-
158. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
159. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976);
cf. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984) (government has no constitutional
duty to preserve suspected drunk driver's breath sample unless the evidence "might be
expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense").
160. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982); cf.
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59 (1978) (using outcome-oriented prej-
udice requirement to define right to a speedy trial).
161. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986).
162. See Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146-47 (1986).
163. 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
164. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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closes use of an impact-on-the-outcome prejudice test to define a de-
fendant's right to cross-examine a government witness for bias. The
Court stated: "IT]he focus of the Confrontation Clause is on individual
witnesses. Accordingly, the focus of the prejudice inquiry in determin-
ing whether the confrontation right has been violated must be on the
particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire trial."' 65 Although
only enunciated in a single case, the Court's reasoning is of general
applicability. It implies that courts should eschew reliance on a strict
outcome-oriented prejudice test whenever a defendant asserts a right
based on the confrontation clause or the compulsory process clause,16 6
which also speaks of "witnesses." In fact, the Court's reasoning is in-
consistent with its earlier decision in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 167
which held that when the government has deported a potential defense
witness, a defendant must show that that witness' testimony may have
affected the outcome in order to establish a compulsory process
violation.
The broad rationale the Court has articulated in support of apply-
ing a prejudice test that does not focus on the outcome reads too much
into the language of the confrontation and compulsory process clauses.
It is true, as the Court has observed, that those clauses speak of wit-
nesses "against" a defendant and "in his favor." The meaning of this
language, though, is not self-evident. The Court's interpretation seems
to require courts to focus solely on the particular witness in question
without regard to his overall role in the case. But it does not strain the
constitutional text to conclude that whether a witness is adverse or
favorable must be determined with reference to all of the evidence ad-
duced at trial. In addition, the language does not answer whether a
witness' "favorableness" or "adverseness" should be determined under
a simple relevance or an impact-on-the-outcome test. That is, it pro-
vides no basis for deciding whether a "favorable" witness is one whose
testimony is merely relevant to the defense, even though it may be en-
tirely cumulative, or is one whose testimony may realistically play a role
in influencing a reasonable jury to return a more favorable verdict.
Lacking clear guidance from the constitutional text, courts must
necessarily consult the purposes of constitutional rights. When it has
defined the existence of a right to obtain and present evidence in terms
of a strict outcome-oriented prejudice test, the Court has in fact ap-
pealed to constitutional purpose. Rather than focusing on constitu-
tional language, these decisions construe a defendant's rights in light of
and as limited by their perceived purpose of ensuring the reliability of
guilty verdicts.' 68 The Court has reasoned that because the concern
165. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1436.
166. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... U.S. Const. amend. VI.
167. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
168. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
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for accurate adjudication of guilt is not implicated when recognition of
an asserted right would have no effect on the outcome, rights having
truth-furthering purposes simply do not exist in such a situation. This
logic asserts that rights should extend no further than strictly necessary
to achieve their underlying purposes.
The rationale that the Court has advanced in support of adopting a
strict outcome-oriented prejudice test at trial, though properly con-
cerned with constitutional purposes, overlooks strong reasons for de-
fining rights more broadly than their truth-furthering purposes strictly
require. An impact-on-the-outcome prejudice test is difficult for courts
to apply before and during trial. °69 Because the nature, strengths and
weaknesses of both the defense and the prosecution will not yet have
been fully exposed, there is a considerable risk that such a requirement
will be misapplied, and a valid right erroneously denied. Even though
an appellate court can rectify the error,17 0 the conviction must be over-
turned and a new trial held. Reversal, of course, impairs the finality of
the trial outcome and retrial requires an added expenditure of judicial
resources. Dispensing with the impact-on-the-outcome prejudice test
in favor of a more relaxed prejudice standard would reduce the risk of
error and better protect the finality of the trial result.
Such an argument-that courts, to protect finality interests, should
adopt a prejudice test that does not focus on the outcome-may strike
some as inconsistent with the argument that the Court has implicitly
given too much weight to finality interests in its harmless error juris-
prudence.' 7 ' The inconsistency, however, is only apparent. When
confronted with a choice between safeguarding the finality of the trial's
outcome and vindicating the purposes of a given constitutional right,
the Court must choose the latter, at least on direct appeal. Yet this is
not the choice a trial court must make when it decides to define a right
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because
it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adver-
sarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to en-
sure that the trial is fair.
In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of coun-
sel], however, we must take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide.
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether coun-
sel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added).
169. In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court recognized the difficulty of applying an impact-
on-the-outcome prejudice test before and during trial, stating: "Because determinations
of materiality are often best made in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial, judges
may wish to defer ruling on motions until after the presentation of the evidence." 458
U.S. at 874.
170. But see supra note 107.
171. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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to obtain or present evidence in terms of a strict outcome-oriented or
some lesser prejudice test. Defining such a right more broadly than its
truth-furthering purpose strictly requires will not sacrifice the purpose
of a constitutional right. Indeed, in many contexts, the interests upon
which such a broad definition will impinge are not very strong. In Van
Arsdall, for instance, where the defendant sought to cross-examine a
government witness concerning favorable treatment he had received
from the government, the only interest in precluding this line of cross-
examination involved saving the court's time. Interests no stronger
than this are outweighed by the increased risk of error and concomitant
loss of finality associated with a strict outcome-oriented prejudice test.
There is no inconsistency in saying that finality must give way to vindi-
cating the purposes of a constitutional right but prevails over a concern
for saving a trial court's time.
Of course, it must be added that the increased risk of error and the
loss of finality associated with a strict outcome-oriented prejudice test
does not mean that such a test is always inappropriate. In some con-
texts, a defendant's right to obtain or present evidence conflicts with
strong governmental interests. A defendant may, for instance, seek to
introduce national security secrets into evidence as part of his de-
fense. 172 The broader the scope of a defendant's right to present evi-
dence at trial, the more it will intrude upon important national security
interests. Because these interests should override the increased risk of
error and loss of finality associated with an outcome-oriented prejudice
test, it makes sense to use such a test to define the scope of a defend-
ant's right to adduce national security secrets in support of his de-
fense. 173 A prejudice test focusing on the outcome preserves the
essential truth-furthering purpose of a defendant's right to present a
defense while minimizing harm to countervailing governmental
interests.
As this discussion demonstrates, the reasons given by the Court for
selecting the specific prejudice test courts should use at trial to define a
defendant's rights to obtain and present evidence are simplistic. One
rationale fails to see important ambiguities in the constitutional text;
the other is too categorical in its use of constitutional purpose. In con-
trast, the approach that we propose would balance the loss of finality
resulting from the difficulty of applying an outcome-oriented prejudice
test at trial against the harm a more broadly defined right would cause
to competing governmental interests.
The approach presented here explains the Court's decisions better
than does either rationale the Court has advanced. Both rationales im-
ply, contrary to the Court's actual decisions, that courts should use one
172. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1984), rev'd in
part and vacated in part, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
173. See Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict: Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to
Present a Defense, and the State Secrets Privilege, 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 177 (1987).
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kind of prejudice test to define all aspects of the right to obtain and
present evidence at trial. Under our approach, the nature of the
appropriate prejudice test varies depending on the strength of the in-
terest in limiting a defendant's right to obtain and present evidence.
Consider a defendant's compulsory process and confrontation
rights to elicit testimony from witnesses at trial. The Court has prop-
erly rejected use of an outcome-oriented prejudice test to define a de-
fendant's right to present evidence in cases where the admission of the
evidence would not infringe upon any substantial governmental inter-
ests. In Van Arsdall, for instance, the Court refused to require the de-
fendant to show outcome-oriented prejudice when the trial court had,
simply to save time, precluded him from cross-examining a government
witness about a source of potential bias. Similarly, in Crane v.
Kentucky, 1 74 the Court held that the trial court had deprived the defend-
ant of either his confrontation or compulsory process rights to present
evidence by excluding testimony casting doubt on the reliability of his
confession. The Court noted that neither the lower courts nor the
prosecution had "advanced any rational justification for the wholesale
exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evidence."' 175 In de-
clining to discuss whether the exclusion of this evidence may have af-
fected the outcome and in remanding the case for application of the
Chapman harmless error rule, the Court implicitly refused to require a
defendant to meet an outcome-oriented prejudice test at trial to estab-
lish a compulsory process or confrontation right to present such evi-
dence. The Court in Crane and Van Arsdall was correct in refusing to
require the defendants to satisfy an outcome-oriented prejudice test at
trial. When the interest favoring exclusion of the evidence is no more
substantial than that of saving the trial court's time, it is outweighed by
the increased risk of error and loss of finality associated with an out-
come-oriented prejudice test.
Unlike the broad rationale upon which the Court relied in Van
Arsdall, however, the approach proposed here does not imply categori-
cal rejection of an outcome-oriented prejudice test in all instances
when a defendant claims a confrontation or compulsory process right
to elicit testimony from a witness. Our approach can thus explain the
Court's decision in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal.176 In that case, the
government had deported some of the aliens whom the defendant had
allegedly transported illegally into this country, thereby preventing the
defense from calling them as witnesses. The Court held that the de-
fendant was required to show that the witnesses' testimony could rea-
sonably have affected the outcome to establish a violation of his
compulsory process rights. Under the approach proposed here, the
Court correctly adopted an outcome-oriented prejudice test. Although
174. 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986).
175. Id. at 2147.
176. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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such a test sacrifices finality to some degree, that sacrifice is outweighed
by the executive branch's article II obligation to enforce immigration
laws. 17 7
Our approach also yields solutions to issues involving confronta-
tion and compulsory process situations that the Court has yet to con-
front. Imagine, for instance, that a defendant seeks to elicit testimony
in derogation of an evidentiary privilege such as the attorney-client or
self-incrimination privilege. The Court has not settled the issue of
whether and to what extent a defendant's right to present a defense
prevails over evidentiary privileges or rules.178 If the right to present a
defense does prevail over a nonarbitrary evidentiary privilege, the
Court should require a defendant to show that the evidence may rea-
sonably affect the outcome as a prerequisite to overcoming the privi-
lege. The Court also has not specified the showing that a defendant
must make to establish a compulsory process right to have the court
subpoena a witness. But when the only reason for refusing to issue a
subpoena relates to time and expense, a defendant should not need to
show that the prospective witness' testimony might reasonably affect
the outcome. Instead, he should be required to show only that the wit-
ness' testimony is relevant to his defense.
In addition to yielding answers to unresolved issues, the approach
we propose furnishes a basis for criticizing other Supreme Court deci-
sions. It suggests that the Court has erred in defining the parameters
of the prosecution's Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory informa-
tion to the defense. 179 This obligation, the Court has held, arises only
177. Id. at 872-73.
178. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2711 n.11 (1987); Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1003 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21-23 & n.21 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957).
Lower courts have not resolved the collision between a defendant's right to present
a defense and evidentiary privileges in an entirely uniform fashion. Compare Valdez v.
Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1984) (attorney-client privilege prevails over
defendant's right to present a defense) with State v. Leecy, 294 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Minn.
1980) (marital privilege must yield to defendant's right to present a defense). Courts
have been virtually unanimous, however, in holding that, at least in the absence of
prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant has no constitutional right to have a court or
prosecutor grant immunity to a potential defense witness who invokes his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d
1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Stacy, supra note 173, at 224-26 & nn.186-87
(citing authority).
For general discussions of the collision between evidentiary privileges and a defend-
ant's right to present a defense, see Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 Colum.
L. Rev. 1173 (1980); Westen, Reflections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege and
Fair Trial," 14 U. Mich.J.L. Ref. 371 (1981); Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note
120, at 159-77; Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935
(1978).
179. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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when the information in question creates a "reasonable probability" of
a different outcome. °8 0 This outcome-oriented prejudice test is gener-
ally applied before trial by the prosecutor, who will often be unaware of
the nature of the planned defense. Even when the prosecutor is aware
of the nature of the defense, his partisan role in the proceedings makes
him particularly likely to overvalue the strengths of his case and under-
value the chance of a successful defense. In combination, these factors
result in an extraordinarily high risk that an outcome-influencing stan-
dard will be misapplied, even by a prosecutor acting in good faith.' 8 '
Given this greater risk of error, a correspondingly stronger gov-
ernmental interest is needed to justify use of an outcome-oriented prej-
udice test. It is true that the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory
information runs counter to the premises of a pure adversary sys-
tem.' 8 2 But the interest in preserving this structure in the criminal con-
text must be weighed in light of the prosecutor's obligation to do
justice and his greater access to investigatory resources. In addition,
the Court has exaggerated the impact that defining the prosecution's
duty of disclosure more broadly would have on the adversary system.
The Court has expressed concern that using a lesser prejudice standard
would "impos[e] upon the prosecutor a constitutional duty to deliver
his entire file to defense counsel."' 8 3 Realistically, though, a standard
of prejudice requiring merely that the government reveal affirmative
evidence of innocence or evidence tending to impeach government wit-
nesses would have no such effect. A prosecutor's files do not consist
mostly, much less entirely, of evidence favorable to the defense. The
strength of the government's general interest in nondisclosure should
be deemed insufficient to outweigh the risk that an outcome-oriented
prejudice test will be erroneously applied, thereby necessitating rever-
sal. It is a mistake, then, to use such a standard in defining the prosecu-
tion's Brady obligations.'
8 4
In sum, the Court has not articulated a persuasive rationale courts
can use in deciding whether to define a defendant's various rights to
180. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
181. Id. at 696-703 (Marshall, J.; dissenting); id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1134 (1982).
183. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 880.
184. Use of a more relaxed standard of prejudice to define the prosecution's Brady
obligations does not eliminate the need for our proposal that courts use a sanction har-
sher than the Chapman rule to deter Brady violations. See supra notes 103-08 and ac-
companying text. The proposal here is aimed at a different problem: the risk that a
prosecutor will in good faith misapply an outcome-oriented prejudice requirement-a
risk that seems unacceptably great because, when Brady issues arise (before and during
trial), prosecutors lack information about the nature and strength of the defense and
because the prosecutor's judgment is skewed by his partisan role. The proposal in Part
II is, in contrast, designed to deter intentional or negligent Brady violations. Such a
sanction is warranted because it is reasonable to presume that a significant number of
such violations will not be detected by defense counsel or the court.
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obtain or present evidence in terms of an outcome-oriented prejudice
test at trial, or a lesser standard, subject to post-trial harmless error
review. The two rationales the Court has advanced, one based on the
constitutional text and the other appealing to constitutional purposes,
are too simplistic and categorical. Instead, courts should be required
to balance the loss of finality resulting from the increased risk that an
outcome-oriented prejudice test will be misapplied at trial against the
strength of any governmental interest a more lenient prejudice test
might impair.
IV. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER OUTCOME-INFLUENCING TESTS
Once it is decided that an impact-on-the-outcome standard is ap-
propriate, either as a harmless error rule or as a prejudice test defining
a right at trial, it becomes necessary to consider the scope of review that
the standard entails. At present, the proper scope of review is the sub-
ject of considerable uncertainty, confusion and dispute.' 8 5 In applying
the Chapman test, for instance, some courts have focused on the essen-
tially empirical question of whether the jury that actually convicted the
defendant would have done so had no constitutional error occurred. 18 6
Others have looked to how a hypothetical average jury would have de-
cided the case in the absence of constitutional error1 87
185. The Florida Supreme Court recently spoke of the confusion many courts ex-
perience in applying the Chapman rule:
In his perceptive essay, The Riddle of Harmless Error, former Chief Justice
Traynor addressed various common errors which, historically, appellate courts
fall into when applying harmless error analysis. The worst is to abdicate judi-
cial responsibility by falling into one of the extremes of all too easy affirmance
or all too easy reversal. Neither course is acceptable. The test must be consci-
entiously applied and the reasoning of the court set forth for the guidance of all
concerned and for the benefit of further appellate review. The test is not a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial
evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an over-
whelming evidence test. Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court
to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986). Ironically, the Florida Supreme
Court has itself often misapprehended the nature of harmless error analysis, employing
on various occasions some of the very tests that it criticizes in DiGuilio. See, e.g., Bundy
v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19 (Fla. 1985) ("After a thorough examination of the record
before us in this case, we feel that sufficient evidence does exist, absent the tainted testi-
mony, upon which the jury could have based its conviction of [defendant]."), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986); Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253, 263 (Fla.) (error harmless
because "other evidence supporting [defendant's] convictions is overwhelming"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 893 (1984).
Other courts and commentators have also noted the confusion surrounding the
meaning of harmless constitutional error. See supra note 13.
186. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427,432 (1972) ("we conclude that the
minds of an average jury' would not have found the State's case significantly less per-
suasive" had the error not occurred) (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
254 (1969)); Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 ("Our judgment [as to whether constitutional
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The scope of review for both the harmless error and the outcome-
oriented prejudice tests must respect a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to ajury trial. While such review is not inevitably incompat-
ible with that right,188 prevailing conceptions of outcome-oriented
standards violate the sixth amendment right to a jury trial by inviting
judges to make probabilistic judgments of a defendant's guilt based on
their own views of the weight and credibility of evidence. The inquiry
proposed here preserves the jury's proper role in the criminal process.
This inquiry, which borrows techniques that courts use in ruling on civil
motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment n.o.v.,
asks whether the error (in the case of harmless error review) may have
affected, or the claimed right (in the case of a standard of prejudice)
may affect, a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in a defendant's
favor.
A. Impact-on-the-Outcome Rules and the Jury's Role
The role of a criminal jury unquestionably includes the prerogative
to resolve reasonable disputes concerning the weight and credibility of
the evidence on issues relating to a defendant's guilt or innocence.
1 89
Rules requiring judges to assess the impact of error on the outcome
create a danger of sanctioning judicial intrusion upon ajury's role. Ide-
ally, a reviewing court assessing the impact of constitutional error
would simply determine how the jury would have decided an issue in
the absence of constitutional error. Unfortunately, courts cannot know
how ajury would have resolved questions of fact over which reasonable
persons can disagree. The Supreme Court has therefore formulated
the impact-on-the-outcome standards in terms of "reasonable
probability" and "reasonable doubt." As a result of these ambiguous
directions, however, lower courts seeking to apply these standards have
often usurped the jury's constitutional prerogatives.
1. Displacing the Jury. - A few appellate courts have held that con-
stitutional error may be harmless if the jury reached the "correct re-
sult." 190  This approach necessarily requires the appellate court to
imagine the result it would have reached had it been the trier of fact,
thereby substituting its own judgment for that of the jury. By basing its
error is harmless] must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to
us to have been the probable impact of [the error] on the minds of the average jury.").
188. See infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text,
189. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1980) ("It is for Uu-
rors], generally, and not for appellate courts, to say that a particular witness spoke the
truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story."); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 n.13
(1964) (questions concerning credibility of evidence are for the jury); United States v.
Toomey, 764 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1985) ("It is the jury's duty to weigh the evidence
and determine what version of the facts to believe."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 828 (1986).
190. R. Traynor, supra note 11, at 18-22, and cases cited therein; see State v.
Watkins, 219 Kan. 81, 94, 547 P.2d 810, 822 (1976); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
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decision to vacate or uphold the conviction on its own evaluation of the
weight and credibility of the evidence, these appellate courts usurp the
jury's role. 191
The Chapman rule, by directing courts' attention to the impact of
error on juries, obviously differs from the "correct result" approach.
Nonetheless, certain conceptions of the Chapman harmless error rule
and the "reasonable probability" prejudice test entail similar, if less
blatant, interference with ajury's prerogatives. Some courts have come
very close to treating the Chapman rule as embracing a sufficiency of the
evidence inquiry,1 92 even though the Supreme Court has stated une-
quivocably that harmless error analysis is not a sufficiency of the evi-
dence test. 193 Under this understanding of harmless error, a conviction
must be upheld if a rational jury drawing all inferences in the govern-
ment's favor at a trial free from constitutional error could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'9 4 This approach obvi-
ously does not adequately protect a defendant's right to ajury trial, for
it presupposes that the jury did or will resolve all evidentiary conflicts
in the prosecution's favor.
Other courts do not make the gross error of construing the
Chapman rule as a sufficiency of the evidence test and ask the empirical
question of whether the constitutional error affected the jury that actu-
ally convicted the defendant.' 95 To these courts, harmless beyond a
191. R. Traynor, supra note 11, at 20-21; Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1020; Teitel-
baum, supra note 13, at 1187.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Schmitt, 794 F.2d 555, 560 (10th Cir. 1986) ("We
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the quantum of other evidence of appel-
lant's... guilt supports the jury's verdict .... ); United States v. Koopmans, 757 F.2d
901, 905 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding error harmless "because there was more than sufficient
evidence to support the verdict"); Guizar v. Estelle, 640 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (S.D. Cal.
1986) ("It is the opinion of this court that the evidence presented below establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner acted with the [requisite] intent ... and
thus, the error in the [intent] instruction is harmless.").
Some courts commingle a sufficiency of the evidence approach with one or more
other tests. See, e.g., United States v. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir.) (combining
"average jury" and overwhelming evidence tests with sufficiency of the evidence test),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 322 (1986).
193. See, e.g., Bundy v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 295, 297 (1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (noting that Chapman harmless error analysis should not be
confused with review for sufficiency of the evidence); Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.
2464, 2480 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87
(1963) ("We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on
which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of.
The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction.").
194. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (Evidence is sufficient to
support conviction if "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
195. Language in several Supreme Court decisions suggests that harmless error
analysis entails an empirical evaluation of the likely influence the error had on the jury's
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reasonable doubt means that the court is convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error did not actually affect the jury's decision to
convict. Although an error could have influenced a hypothetical rea-
sonable jury applying the reasonable doubt standard and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the defendant's favor, a court may declare the
error harmless so long as it is convinced that the error did not affect the
jury that actually convicted the defendant. This approach would be un-
objectionable if courts had information that would allow them to draw
reliable inferences about how a particular jury resolved disputes about
the weight and credibility of the evidence. Not surprisingly, though,
empirical data show that courts do a remarkably poor job of evaluating
the importance jurors attach to specific issues and evidence.' 96 Be-
decision to convict. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3108 n.11 (1986) (the
proper analysis asks whether the error "in practice clearly had no effect on the out-
come"); Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2472-73 (1986) (heavy weight of evi-
dence "reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by [error]");
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1983) ("The question a reviewing court
must ask is this: absent [constitutional error] is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?"); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
377 (1972) ("Our review of the record.., leaves us with no reasonable doubt that the
jury at petitioner's 1958 trial would have reached the same verdict" had the error not
occurred.).
Several lower courts have since construed these precedents to require such a prag-
matic assessment of the impact of error on the actual convicting jury. See, e.g., Dix v.
Kemp, 804 F.2d 618, 622 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury did not rely on the faulty presumption in reaching its verdict."); Myrick v.
Maschner, 799 F.2d 642, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Rose to require an assess-
ment of whether error actually affected the jury verdict and concluding that burden-
shifting instruction "did not have a practical effect on the determination of the jury");
Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1350 (5th Cir. 1986) (Despite the constitutional
error, "[a]fter an examination of the entire trial record.., it is clear beyond a reason-
able doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty."), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1609 (1987); United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1429 (9th Cir. 1986) (error was
harmless because it "had an insignificant impact, if any, upon the minds of the jurors
who found [defendant] guilty").
In Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987), however, the Court expressly disavowed
the notion that Chapman requires or permits a reviewing court to "retrace the jury's
deliberative processes." Id. at 1922 n.6.
196. In their comprehensive empirical study examiningjury behavior as it relates to
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, Professors Teitelbaum, Sutton-
Barbere andJohnson found strong evidence demonstrating that appellate judges do not
and cannot accurately gauge the impact that particular evidence had or would have had
on the particular jury that convicted the defendant. See Teitelbaum, supra note 13, at
1197.
Other commentators, too, have observed that reviewing courts are not in a position
to assess the impact of particular evidence on particular juries. See, e.g., R. Traynor,
supra note 11, at 20-21; 1 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 13, § 103[06], at 103-80;
Sobieski, The Theoretical Foundations of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 161, 258-59 (1978); see also Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101,
3115 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[a] reviewing court simply cannot determine
whether this jury in fact relied on" a constitutionally impermissible burden-shifting
instruction).
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cause the jury's deliberations are secret, courts have no way to deter-
mine whether the error actually influenced the jury except to rely upon
their own perceptions of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
This empirical conception of Chapman, then, comes close to being the
functional equivalent of the "correct result" test.
Still other courts hold constitutional error harmless under Chapman
if the evidence of guilt is "overwhelming.' 97 Of course, the "evi-
dence" under consideration must be adjusted for the error by including
unconstitutionally excluded evidence and excluding unconstitutionally
admitted evidence. So conceived, the overwhelming evidence test
would be consistent with a defendant's right to a jury trial if "over-
whelming" evidence meant evidence that would compel a rational jury
resolving all reasonable evidentiary conflicts in the defendant's favor to
convict as a matter of law. But in practice most courts employ a less
restrictive definition. Even when a reasonable jury viewing the evi-
dence most favorably to the defendant would not be compelled to con-
vict, these courts describe the evidence of guilt as overwhelming as
long as they are convinced that a hypothetical reasonable or average
jury is highly likely to convict at an error-free trial.' 98 To determine
197. Several Supreme Court opinions suggest an "overwhelming evidence" test of
harmless constitutional error without explaining the meaning of "overwhelming." See,
e.g., Bundy v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 295, 297 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3110 (Burger, CJ., concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 512 (1983); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377
(1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 (1972). Perhaps due to the Court's per-
sistent use of the concept of "overwhelming evidence" in connection with its discussions
of the Chapman rule, "[t]here has been a marked tendency in the circuit courts to find
constitutional error harmless when they find other evidence of guilt overwhelming, with-
out specifically analyzing the prejudicial effect of the error itself." 1 Weinstein's Evi-
dence, supra note 13, § 103[08], at 103-97 to -98 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (footnote
omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
error harmless even though some evidence supported defendant's claim of innocence
because "the government presented overwhelming evidence"); Flittie v. Solem, 775
F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir. 1985) ("It is unlikely that [the error] had a major impact on the
jury in determining whether these witnesses were believable. The whole record shows
overwhelming independent evidence to support the conviction."), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1025 (1986). Yet in Chapman itself, the Court suggested that harmless error analysis
should not be cast as an overwhelming evidence test. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 23 (1967) (noting state court's "overemphasis" on its own view that the evidence of
guilt was "overwhelming").
Some judges and many commentators have criticized the widespread characteriza-
tion of Chapman harmless error analysis as an overwhelming evidence test, though not
necessarily for the reasons given here. See, e.g., Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870,
884-87 (5th Cir.) (Clark,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); United States
v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 269-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (Sneed, J., dissenting); Field, supra note
11, at 33; St.John's Note, supra note 13, at 559-62.
198. See, e.g., Washington v. Scully, 640 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("The mere existence of a rational basis in the evidence to justify [a finding that the
defendant lacked the requisite intent] does not itself negate the circumstances that the
evidence with respect to intent was so overwhelming as to justify a finding that the
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how such ajury is likely to resolve reasonable evidentiary conflicts, such
courts naturally cannot and do not submit the case to a statistically sig-
nificant number of reasonable juries. As with the empirical approach,
courts lack any objective indicia upon which to base this kind of predic-
tion. Unless they engage in "unguided speculation,"199 then, courts
applying this probabilistic conception of the overwhelming evidence
test must rely on their own views concerning the weight and credibility
of the evidence.
The outcome-oriented prejudice test that the Supreme Court has
used to define various components of a defendant's right of access to
evidence and his right to effective assistance of counsel suffers from
similar shortcomings. Under this standard, a defendant must demon-
strate that there is a "reasonable probability" that the asserted error
will affect the outcome.200 Few courts have construed this standard to
mean that a defendant need only demonstrate that a jury could reason-
ably acquit based in part on the evidence in question, or that counsel's
unprofessional errors could reasonably have influenced a jury. Rather,
courts have considered only whether there is a substantial probability
that a jury would acquit based on the evidence sought or an improved
performance by counsel. 20 1 Yet, there are no objective factors upon
which courts can rely in determining the probability of various reason-
able resolutions of evidentiary conflicts and, hence, of various reason-
able outcomes. Thus, they must depend only on their own perceptions
of the strength and credibility of the evidence.
2. Preserving the Jury's Role. - The Chapman harmless error rule and
the "reasonable probability" prejudice test must be redefined so that
they adequately protect the jury's exclusive authority to decide the
weight and credibility of evidence. The formulation proposed here
borrows techniques that courts use in civil cases to decide motions for
summary judgments, directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v. When rul-
ing on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a
court is required to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in
the nonmovant's favor; it may not grant a motion for summary judg-
ment or directed verdict because it concludes that a reasonable jury is
Sandstrom error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2485 (1987); cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 512 (1983) ("[i]n the face of this
overwhelming evidence of guilt and the inconsistency of the scanty evidence tendered
by the defendants," error was harmless).
199. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978).
200. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Brimberry, 803 F.2d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1977
(1987); Whitley v. Barr, 802 F.2d 1487, 1496 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1618 (1987); Government of V.I. v. Nicholas, 639 F. Supp. 486, 489-90 (D.V.I. 1986),
aff'd, 819 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1987); Government of V.I. v.Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 940
(D.V.I. 1986).
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highly likely to find in favor of the moving party.20 2 The court is
required to deny the motion if it would be reasonable for a jury apply-
ing the relevant standard of proof20 3 to find in the nonmovant's favor,
whatever the likelihood that it will actually do so. Similarly, a court may
grant a motion for judgment n.o.v. only if it concludes that no reason-
able view of the evidence would support the verdict.
20 4
The purpose of these limitations on summary judgments, directed
verdicts and judgments n.o.v. is to preserve the jury's prerogative to
decide the weight and credibility of the evidence; they are a function of
the seventh amendment right to ajury trial in civil cases. 20 5 Certainly a
202.
If the defendant in a... civil case moves for summary judgment or for a di-
rected verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask
himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the
other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on
the evidence presented ....
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,
whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infer-
ences are to be drawn in his favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512-13 (1986). See generally Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-61
(1970) (discussing standard for granting summary judgment); Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949) (discussing standard for denying directed verdict); Brady v.
Southern R.R., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943) (discussing standards for directed verdict
and judgment n.o.v.).
203. Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
204. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519
F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); O'Neil v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
410 F.2d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1969); Harner v.John McShain, Inc., 394 F.2d 480,482 (4th
Cir. 1968); see also 5AJ. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 50.0712], at 50-64 (1987 &
Supp. 1987) (motion for judgment n.o.v. may be granted "only when, without weighing
the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
proper judgment").
205. Respecting the role played by the seventh amendment in shaping summary
judgment standards, the Fifth Circuit has said:
The [summary judgment] procedure, valuable as it is for striking through sham
claims and defences which stand in the way of a direct approach to the truth of
a case, was not intended to, it cannot deprive a litigant of, or at all encroach
upon, his right to ajury trial.
Judges in giving its flexible provisions effect must do so with this essential
limitation constantly in mind. To proceed to summary judgment it is not suffi-
cient then that the judge may not credit testimony proffered on a tendered
issue. It must appear that there is no substantial evidence on it, that is, either
that the tendered evidence is in its nature too incredible to be accepted by
reasonable minds, or that conceding its truth, it is without legal probative force.
Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1940); see also, e.g., Elliot v. Elliot, 49
F.R.D. 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("Since we are dealing with a procedure that operates
in the shadow of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury, if there is any
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criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial, which the
Supreme Court has declared to be of special importance, 20 6 deserves
no less protection.
This conclusion has important implications. It means that a court
should not uphold a conviction or conclude that a defendant has not
shown the requisite level of outcome-influencing prejudice when the
court's judgment is based on its own probabilistic impressions of what a
jury actually did or what a hypothetical reasonable jury is likely to do.
Such actions would be inconsistent with, a defendant's constitutional
right to a jury trial. As in the civil contexts, courts should focus solely
on what it would be reasonable for a jury to do rather than the
probability of various reasonable outcomes. To hold that error did not
affect the outcome or that a defendant has not shown outcome-oriented
prejudice, the court should have to conclude that the error did not or a
claimed right would not affect the outcome as a matter of law.
In many situations, the outcome-oriented prejudice test requires a
defendant to show that a particular piece of evidence may affect the
outcome. 20 7 Under the probabilistic conceptions of the standard that
now exist, courts can and do deny defendants a right to obtain and
present the evidence because it is of doubtful credibility or because it
might, though not necessarily, be regarded as cumulative. 208 Instead,
courts should ask whether it would be reasonable for a jury to acquit
doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment cannot be
granted."); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2714,
at 620-25 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
The same concern for protecting civil litigants' seventh amendment right to a jury
trial circumscribes the courts' authority to grant directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v.
See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
206. The Court has said that the right to a jury trial in criminal cases reflects
a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to
entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to
a group ofjudges.... The deep commitment of the Nation to the right ofjury
trial in serious criminal cases ... qualifies for protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
States.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). In contrast, the Court has never held
the seventh amendment guaranty of ajury trial in civil cases to be generally applicable to
the states. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876).
207. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 645 F. Supp. 374, 417 (D. Wyo. 1986) (no
Brady violation when defendant's theories as to exculpatory nature of evidence were
"highly speculative," record already contained "much of the same information," and an
"abundance of evidence" of defendant's guilt existed); Smith v. State, 500 So. 2d 973,
980 (Miss. 1986) (no Brady violation when evidence of defendant's guilt was "over-
whelming"); Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 285 (Wyo. 1986) (evidence was not "ex-
culpatory" when it merely corroborated what defendant himself had testified), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1321 (1987); cf. Orsini v. State, 287 Ark. 456, 460, 701 S.W.2d 114,
117 (1985) (Bagley places a "heavy burden" on defendant to show that disclosure of
evidence sought would have "affect[ed) the verdict"); see also infra note 211.
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based in part on the evidence in question.20 9 This is an important dif-
ference. A court would deny a defendant's right to present the evi-
dence on grounds that it is cumulative only if the evidence is
cumulative as a matter of law; that is, ajury could not reasonably regard
the evidence as adding anything to the other evidence a defendant will
be able to present.210 Furthermore, the court would not deny a de-
fendant a right to present evidence because it was of dubious credibil-
ity.2 11 It could hold that the evidence would not affect the judgment of
a reasonable jury on credibility grounds only if the evidence was incred-
ible as a matter of law; that is, no reasonable person would believe it.212
Of course, a court applying the outcome-oriented prejudice test would
deny a defendant a right to present particular evidence if it concluded
that, even considering the proffered evidence, the evidence of guilt was
so overwhelming that a jury could not reasonably acquit. Before a
court concluded that the evidence was "overwhelming," however, it
would have to resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the defendant's favor
(including any created by the evidence in question) and take account of
the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
209. Cf. State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 965, 971 (La. 1986) (Brady violation occurred
where undisclosed evidence was such that "a rational trier" of fact could find based on
the evidence that homicide was justified).
210. Thus, evidence should not be considered cumulative merely because it tends
to establish the same facts as properly admitted evidence. See Holland v. Attorney Gen.,
777 F.2d 150, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1986) (erroneously admitted evidence was not cumulative
and error was therefore not harmless even though evidence was not "significantly differ-
ent" from properly admitted evidence). For a court holding the erroneous admission of
evidence harmless when the evidence could possibly, but not necessarily, be regarded as
cumulative by a rational jury, see United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347-48 (9th
Cir. 1986) (evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment was deemed cumulative
and therefore admission of the evidence was held harmless, even though evidence, con-
sisting of defendant's statement that he lived in the apartment where cocaine was found,
was significantly different in kind from circumstantial evidence tending to show that.de-
fendant lived in the apartment and the circumstantial evidence was even rebutted by
defendant's friends' trial testimony that he did not live there).
211. This limitation on harmless error analysis would seem obvious given the jury's
constitutional prerogative to decide the credibility of witnesses. Nevertheless, despite
the clear constitutional requirement that the jury rather than the judge decide credibility
matters, appellate courts applying outcome-influencing standards often makejudgments
concerning the credibility of particular evidence or witnesses. See, e.g., United States v.
Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding exclusion of a potential defense wit-
ness to be harmless error because witness would not have been credible).
212. For a general discussion of the doctrine of inherent incredibility as it applies in
criminal cases, see United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 436-41 (E.D. Va. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The doctrine of inher-
ent incredibility has been construed quite narrowly in criminal cases, permitting a court
to exclude testimony only when it contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws. United
States v. Lerma, 657 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing cases), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
921 (1982); cf. Baker v. Montgomery, 811 F.2d 557, 559-61 (11th Cir. 1987) (court
concluded that defendant's "self-serving" testimony was unbelievable as a matter of law
because it was contrary to all other evidence).
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The Chapman harmless error rule typically comes into play when a
trial court has unconstitutionally excluded evidence, when it has uncon-
stitutionally admitted evidence or when an error has been committed
that may have unconstitutionally skewed the jury's perception of the
evidence. When evidence has been unconstitutionally excluded, a re-
viewing court's inquiry should be identical to that entailed by the
outcome-oriented prejudice test: the error would not be considered
harmless unless it would be unreasonable for a jury to acquit based in
part on the evidence in question.
The inquiry is somewhat different when evidence has been uncon-
stitutionally admitted rather than excluded. One might expect that the
error should be held harmful only if it would have been reasonable for
ajury to rely in part on the erroneously admitted evidence in convicting
the defendant. This formulation, however, does not adequately protect
the right that has been violated by admitting the improper evidence.
Imagine that a court has erroneously and unconstitutionally admitted
irrelevant but highly prejudicial testimony. Although it would not be
reasonable for ajury to be affected by such testimony, there is a danger
that the evidence may actually have influenced the verdict. Courts
could attempt to address this danger by attempting to estimate the like-
lihood that erroneously admitted evidence actually affected the jury's
decision. Yet courts have no way to do this except to rely on their own
views of the weight and credibility of the other evidence of guilt. Both
to preserve the jury's constitutional prerogatives and to ensure that er-
roneously admitted evidence did not affect the verdict, courts should
vacate the conviction whenever the properly admitted evidence, wholly
apart from the erroneously admitted evidence, would permit a reason-
able jury to find in the defendant's favor on any dispositive issue possi-
bly affected by the error.
2 13
This formulation of the Chapman rule should apply not only when
the constitutional error involved the erroneous admission of evidence,
but also when the error may have skewed the jury's perception of the
evidence. 21 4 In this situation, too, an error may have influenced the
213. Cf. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182, 1191 (1985) (when
constitutional error results in the erroneous admission of evidence, appellate court must
"look[] only at the untainted evidence to determine if the untainted evidence is so over-
whelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1208 (1986).
214. Suppose, for example, that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that
"a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his actions." When given
in the context of a case in which intent is an element of the crime with which the defend-
ant is charged, such an instruction violates the defendant's due process right to have the
prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). A Sandstrom error has the potential to influence the
way that the jury views the evidence by creating the impression that the defendant has
the burden to prove that he did not possess the requisite intent.
In Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986), the Court held that Sandstrom errors could
be harmless under Chapman and remanded for a consideration of whether the error in
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jury even though an ideally rational jury would have disregarded it.
Courts should reverse unless the evidence of guilt would compel any
rational jury resolving all evidentiary conflicts in the defendant's favor
to find against the defendant on the issue affected by the error.2 15 This
is the only way that appellate courts can ensure that the error did not
influence the jury's decision to convict while preserving the jury's pre-
rogative to decide the weight and credibility of the evidence.
This harmless error inquiry would undoubtedly require courts to
vacate convictions more frequently than they do under current under-
standings of the Chapman rule. For example, when evidence has been
unconstitutionally excluded, the error would be held harmless only if
the evidence is cumulative, unbelievable or irrelevant as a matter of law
or a jury resolving all evidentiary conflicts in a defendant's favor could
not reasonably acquit. In addition, this conception of the outcome-ori-
ented prejudice test demands recognition of broader rights, for courts
may no longer decline to recognize such rights based on their own
probabilistic impressions of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Obviously, as more convictions are vacated, less protection would
be afforded to interests in finality and efficiency than under received
understandings of the Chapman rule and the "reasonable probability of
a different outcome" prejudice test. Yet such understandings unjustifi-
ably promote efficiency and finality at the expense of failing to vindicate
constitutional rights. In situations where Chapman is designed to repair
rather than deter, the prevailing conceptions of Chapman prevent the
full accomplishment of this purpose. The defendant loses the opportu-
that case was harmless. The Court suggested that the appellate court should make a
"practical assessment" of whether the error had an effect on the jury's decision to con-
vict based on its own review of the record. As we have suggested, though, this prag-
matic approach to harmless error review invites judges simply to assess the strength of
the evidence against the defendant on the question of intent, and affirm the conviction if
they find that evidence to be "overwhelming" or otherwise substantial.
The formulation proposed here is more precise, and would require a reviewing
court to consider whether a rational jury could have found that the defendant lacked intent
based on the evidence presented to it. As a practical matter, this means that a Sandslrom
error cannot be harmless if the issue of intent is disputed and there is evidence, includ-
ing the defendant's own testimony, from which a reasonable jury could entertain a rea-
sonable doubt as to his intent. Accord State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 535, 608 P.2d
428, 459 (holding Sandstrom error harmless where "[no] reasonable juror could.., have
found [that defendant lacked requisite intent] on [uncontradicted] proof presented by
the State"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980).
215. In Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987), the Supreme Court appeared to
frame the harmless error inquiry in these terms. In Pope, the trial court had committed
constitutional error in instructing the jury as to the standard governing whether alleg-
edly obscene material has any redeeming social value. The Court declared that the error
should be deemed harmless "if no rational juror" applying the proper standard could
conclude that the material had redeeming social value. Id. at 1922 (emphasis added).
This language implies that the error is harmless if and only if a rational jury would be
compelled to find the existence of the element of the crime affected by the constitutional
error.
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nity he would otherwise have had to have a jury resolve all reasonable
evidentiary conflicts in his favor at a trial free from constitutional error.
The evidence is instead weighed by a judge whose experience with the
criminal justice system often breeds a cynicism and skepticism that con-
trasts sharply with the fresh and open attitude of many jurors. For the
same reason, permitting judges to weigh the evidence also tends to un-
dermine the deterrent effect of the Chapman harmless error rule. By
denying the jury the prerogative to resolve all reasonable evidentiary
conflicts in the defendant's favor based on a judicial determination that
such a resolution is unlikely, prevailing conceptions of Chapman give
prosecutors an incentive to commit constitutional error.
Finality and efficiency interests do not justify compromising the de-
terrent and remedial purposes of the Chapman rule.2 1 6 This conclusion
finds compelling support in a comparison of the relative importance of
finality and efficiency in civil and criminal proceedings. As our consti-
tutional and statutory commitment to the availability of habeas corpus
attests, 2 17 finality and efficiency concerns carry relatively less sway in
criminal cases than they do in civil cases-a product of a criminal de-
fendant's countervailing liberty interest.2 18 Yet the existing concep-
tions of the Chapman rule, apparently in the name of finality and
efficiency, anomalously accord a criminal defendant's right to a jury
trial less respect than that of a civil litigant. The formulation of the
Chapman rule and the related "reasonable probability of a different out-
come" prejudice test suggested here would eliminate this anomaly by
adapting standards civil courts use in ruling on motions for directed
verdict, summary judgment and judgment n.o.v. 2 19 It thus safeguards
the jury's prerogative to weigh the evidence and places a criminal de-
fendant's sixth amendment jury trial right on equal footing with a civil
litigant's seventh amendment jury trial right.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed, much less de-
fended, the view that interests in finality and efficiency give a court au-
thority to uphold a conviction although a jury, in a trial free of
constitutional error, might rationally have acquitted. If the Court does
216. This is true at least on direct appeal. Whether it is true in habeas corpus pro-
ceeding raises questions of statutory construction concerning the intended scope of the
federal habeas corpus statutes. See supra note 51.
217. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, c. 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1982).
218. E.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) ("Conventional notions of
finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of
constitutional rights is alleged."); cf. id. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting):
But the Government recognizes, as indeed it must in view of the decisions, that
strict doctrines of resjudicata do not apply in this field. The consequences of
injustice-loss of liberty and sometimes loss of life-are far too great to permit
the automatic application of an entire body of technical rules whose primary
relevance lies in the area of civil litigation.
219. Although courts decide motions for directed verdict and summary judgment
before judgment and before finality interests have attached, motions for judgment n.o.v.
are decided after judgment.
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not remove the ambiguities in its harmless error jurisprudence that
have enabled courts to assume authority to decide the weight and credi-
bility of the evidence, it ought to explain on what theory courts have
such authority.
B. Impact-on-the-Outcome Rules and Jury Nullification
Some commentators have contended that the Chapman rule neces-
sarily violates the sixth amendment right to ajury trial because it inter-
feres with the jury's power of nullification. 220 If properly conceived,
however, harmless error review can be consistent with the legitimate
bases for jury nullification and the limited role existing law implicitly
reserves for that power.
In criminal cases, a jury's constitutional role arguably extends be-
yond that of resolving reasonable conflicts in the evidence. 22 1 The
right to a jury trial, which allows juries rather than judges to decide
questions of fact, is certainly intended in part to ensure that factually
innocent persons are not unjustly convicted. 222 It is an important co-
rollary to the reasonable doubt standard, for it is more likely that one
out of twelve jury members 223 will entertain a reasonable doubt as to a
220. See, e.g., Field, supra note 11, at 33-35; Goldberg, supra note 6, at 427, 429;
Mause, supra note 11, at 531; Cornell Note, supra note 11, at 542-43.
221. In civil cases the constitutional role of a jury is limited to the resolution of
reasonable conflicts in the evidence. The seventh amendment expressly describes a civil
jury's role in terms of deciding facts. The seventh amendment states, "In Suits at com-
mon law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. Const. amend. VII (emphasis added). The language of the sixth
amendment, in contrast, provides only that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The
Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged that there are differences between the scope
of the sixth and seventh amendment jury trial rights. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 157 (1973) (recognizing that "the purpose of the jury trial in criminal cases [is] to
prevent government oppression ... and, in criminal and civil cases, to assure a fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues") (citations omitted). See infra notes 225-26 and
accompanying text.
222. Common sense suggests that the unanimous (or near unanimous) judgment of
twelve (or nine, or six) jurors is less likely to result in the conviction of a factually inno-
cent person than the opinion of a single judge. The principal advantage of jury over
judge as a fact-finding device is the process of deliberation that necessarily precedes a
jury verdict. See Joiner, From the Bench, in The Jury System in America 145, 146-47
(R. Simon ed. 1975). Standards of appellate review that permit reviewing courts greater
latitude to set aside nonjury verdicts implicitly recognize the greater reliability of jury
verdicts. See Schneider v. Pomerville, 348 Mich. 49, 54-55, 81 N.W.2d 405, 408 (1957).
Of course, not all commentators would agree that the modem jury fulfills its func-
tion of enhancing the reliability of results in judicial proceedings. See McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) ("Although the function of the jury is to find
facts, that body is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscien-
tious judge.") (White, J., concurring); J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 180-81
(1930) (judge will find facts more objectively than randomly selected panel ofjurors).
223. The Supreme Court has, of course, held that a criminal jury need not consist
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defendant's guilt than it is that a single judge will do So.224 Reliability
of guilty verdicts, however, is not the sole aim of the sixth amendment
jury trial right.22 5 A criminal jury has historically had the prerogative
to "nullify" the law; that is, to acquit a defendant although it would be
unreasonable for a jury resolving all evidentiary conflicts in his favor to
do so. 22 6 If jury nullification has a constitutional status, then perhaps
commentators are correct in asserting that impact-on-the-outcome
rules violate a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial. At the very
least, the impact-on-the-outcome rules proposed in the preceding sec-
tion would have to be reconsidered.
Existing law sends conflicting signals concerning the constitutional
status ofjury nullification. On the one hand, in embracing the Chapman
of twelve members, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and that its verdict need
not be unanimous, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). But the Court has
sought to preserve the essential functions of the historical requirements of twelve jurors
and unanimity. Thus, it has held that ajury consisting of five or fewer persons is consti-
tutionally unacceptable, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), because it creates
an unacceptable risk of erroneous guilty verdicts.
224. The Supreme Court has said that the reasonable doubt standard derives not
from the sixth amendment right to a jury trial, but from the due process clauses. See
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411-12 ("We are quite sure.., that the Sixth Amendment itself has
never been held to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.... The
reasonable-doubt argument is rooted, in effect, in due process .... ). Nevertheless,
these two constitutional protections are certainly intertwined. Indeed, one of the princi-
pal objections raised to the Supreme Court's decision that the sixth amendment jury
trial right does not include a right to a unanimous verdict, see supra note 223, was that
this holding effectively undermined the reasonable doubt requirement. See Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 399-403 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225. "A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968); see
also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) ("The jury trial right] was clearly
intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government .... ").
226. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972); L.
Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 36-37 (2d ed. 1986); R. Traynor, supra note 11,
at 30-33; Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
289, 321-22 (1966); Kadish & Kadish, The Institutionalization of Conflict, in Law, Jus-
tice, and the Individual in Society 308, 309 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977); Scheflin,
Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 168, 169 (1972); Note, Jury
Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 New Eng. L. Rev. 105, 106 (1971). Until the mid-
seventeenth century, the criminal jury could be punished for rendering a false verdict.
F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 11-12 (1951); L. Levy, supra, at 36-37. The jury's
power to grant a verdict inconsistent with the law without fear of punishment stems
from Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), a case involving the
prosecution of William Penn for unlawful assembly. Henderson, supra, at 321.
In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895), the Supreme Court held that
criminal juries are not empowered to decide the law as well as the facts. Yet Sparf also
acknowledged that a court may never instruct a criminal jury to find the defendant guilty
no matter how overwhelming the evidence against him. Id. at 105. "The right [to nul-
lify) was gone, but the power remained." L. Moore, The Jury 151 (1973). The notion
that a criminal jury can nullify the law continues to be reflected in the well-established
principles that a trial court may not direct a verdict of guilty, propound special interrog-
atories or set aside a verdict of not guilty in a criminal case.
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harmless error rule and the "reasonable probability of a different out-
come" prejudice test, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the no-
tion that a defendant has a constitutional right to an opportunity to
have the jury acquit unreasonably. 227 In addition, federal appellate
courts have held that the Constitution does not require that the jury be
informed of its prerogative to nullify the law, 228 and that defendants
are not entitled to introduce evidence bearing on the traditional bases
for jury nullification. 229 On the other hand, the Court has consistently
declared that even when the evidence of guilt is absolutely compelling,
courts are constitutionally prohibited from directing a verdict of guilty
against a defendant. 230 It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify this
prohibition unless a criminal jury's traditional prerogative to nullify the
law has constitutional dimensions.
This uneasy tension in the Court's precedents could be eliminated
by acknowledging that jury nullification has a legitimate, though lim-
ited, constitutional status in criminal cases. Nullification has quite
properly played a circumscribed role in criminal prosecutions, permit-
ting a jury to return an unreasonable verdict only when convicting a
defendant would deeply offend the community's most fundamental val-
ues. In its approved form, nullification enables ajury to show mercy for
a defendant whose plight is especially sympathetic, 23' to prevent prose-
cutors from using the criminal process for improper reasons such as
squelching dissent 232 and to block enforcement of antiquated or un-
227. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ("A defendant has no en-
titlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be
reviewed.").
228. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 449-50 (7th Cir. 1983);
Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130-37.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
230. "We have stated that 'a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict ... regardless of
how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.'" Rose v. Clark, 106 S.
Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
572-73 (1977)); see also United Brotherhood of Carpenters &Joiners v. United States,
330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) ("For a judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how
conclusive the evidence.").
The rule that a criminal jury may return inconsistent verdicts, Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932), also may be explainable in terms of a desire to protect
the jury's nullification function. See Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in
the Federal Courts, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 651 (1950) ("[The jury's function" is one of
"finding a solution for those occasional hard cases in which 'law and justice do not coin-
cide.'") (quotingJ. Frank, Courts on Trial 127-28 (1949)).
231. In "cases having a de minimis cast or a note of contributory fault or of provoca-
tion... [t]hejury will exercise its de facto powers to write these equities into the crimi-
nal law." H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 285 (1966).
232. "Most often commended [is] the 18th century acquittal of Peter Zenger of
seditious libel, on the plea of Alexander Hamilton . . . ." United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44
Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910):
Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration. The
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popular laws that do not reflect a community's basic values. 233 The
constitutional prohibition against directed verdicts of guilty ensures
that in every case a jury has an opportunity to nullify the law. But if
nullification were to gain undue prominence juries would usurp the
role of legislatures to declare law, thus disrupting the democratic pro-
cess. Further, criminal trials would become wide-ranging and pro-
tracted inquiries into both a defendant's background and the
prosecutor's reasons for initiating charges. The courts' refusal to rec-
ognize a constitutional right on the part of a defendant to introduce
evidence that might prompt nullification and to inform ajury of its nul-
lification power ensures that nullification is confined to its proper role.
These rules help ensure that when nullification occurs it is only because
the prosecution offends fundamental and widely accepted values. 234
Extending this limited constitutional protection to jury nullifica-
tion does not preclude use of an outcome-oriented harmless error rule
or prejudice test. Those commentators who assume that outcome-ori-
ented harmless error rules cannot be squared with a jury's nullification
power implicitly appeal to a misguided view of the nature ofjury nullifi-
cation. Under this view, ajury's nullification power permits it to render
a verdict of acquittal for legally irrelevant reasons or for no reason at
all.2 35 It follows that a court intrudes upon ajury's prerogatives in con-
cluding, for example, that unconstitutionally excluded evidence had no
impact on the outcome. Even though admission of the evidence may
will of the state at large imposed on a reluctant community, the will of a major-
ity imposed on a vigorous and determined minority, find the same obstacle in
the local jury that formerly confronted kings and ministers.
Id. at 18.
233. Widespread distaste for the law explains the large number of acquittals in
prosecutions brought under seditious libel, fugitive slave and alcohol prohibition laws.
H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, supra note 231, at 286. See Scheflin, supra note 226:
A juror who is forced by the judge's instructions to convict a defendant whose
conduct he applauds, or at least feels is justifiable, will lose respect for the legal
system which forces him to reach such a result against the dictates of his con-
science. The concept of trial by ajury of one's peers is emasculated by denying
to the juror his right to act on the basis of his personal morality. For if the jury
is the "conscience of the community," how can it be denied the right to func-
tion accordingly?
Id. at 183 (citation omitted), cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("[T]he
essential feature of ajury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of
guilty or innocence.").
234. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136-37; accord M. Kadish & S. Kadish, Discretion to
Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules 35, 59-66 (1973); cf. H.
Kalven & H. Zeisel, supra note 231, at 498 ("Perhaps one reason why the jury exercises
its very real power so sparingly is because it is officially told it has none."). But see
Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Dis-
obedience, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1289, 1297-1305 (1974) (arguing against the legitimacy of
jury nullification).
235. E.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 13, at 1191.
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not affect the judgment of a reasonable jury, it could influence ajury to
acquit for legally irrelevant reasons or for no reason at all.
Properly conceived, however, nullification does not refer to a
power to acquit for any legally irrelevant reason or for no reason at all.
Insofar as it is constitutionally significant, jury nullification should con-
template a power to acquit for three categories of legally irrelevant rea-
sons only: a defendant's motivations for committing the crime are so
sympathetic that he does not deserve criminal punishment; a prosecu-
tor has an impermissible motive for bringing charges such as a desire to
silence a political opponent, harrass a defendant or further his own ca-
reer; or the law under which a defendant is prosecuted conflicts with
deep-seated contemporary values. Jury nullification, then, should not
enable the jury to acquit "unreasonably." Instead, it should only per-
mit the jury to acquit for reasons that, though legally irrelevant, reflect
fundamental community values.
If jury nullification is confined to its proper place in the criminal
justice scheme, it becomes evident that outcome-oriented harmless er-
ror rules need not be rejected outright. Instead, they can be revised to
accommodate the limited constitutional protection that should be ac-
corded jury nullification. The only constitutional right that ought to be
derived from the jury's nullification powers is the right against having
the court direct a verdict of guilty, because this right ensures that a jury
has an opportunity to nullify the law for constitutionally legitimate rea-
sons. Harmless error rules must ensure that constitutional error does
not restrict this opportunity in ways that are inconsistent with the rea-
sons for extending this limited constitutional protection to the jury's
nullification powers. It follows that constitutional error that is other-
wise harmless does not justify reversal due solely to the jury's nullifica-
tion powers unless the error incidentally bears a logical relationship to
one of the three traditional bases of nullification.
The concern for jury nullification will not often require a court to
vacate a conviction that it would otherwise uphold. Consider, for ex-
ample, a case in which the trial court committed constitutional error by
precluding defense counsel from cross-examining a government wit-
ness about his animosity for the defendant. If this witness' testimony
was cumulative as a matter of law, the suggested reformulation of the
Chapman rule would necessitate that the conviction be upheld. Jury nul-
lification would require reversal only if the unconstitutionally excluded
impeachment evidence also happened to be incidentally relevant to any
of the three reasons for extending constitutional protection to jury nul-
lification. This would occur in the rare case in which the excluded testi-
mony not only constituted relevant impeachment evidence but also, for
instance, suggested a political motivation for the prosecution. In such a
case, constitutional error would have impaired the opportunity for nul-
lification protected by the prohibition against directed verdicts of
guilty.
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CONCLUSION
The utility of the approach to harmless constitutional error pro-
posed here is both practical and theoretical. On a practical level, the
approach better guides lower courts, which have been forced to grapple
with a misconceived body of law. The approach furnishes a principled
means for courts to choose between the Chapman harmless error rule
and a rule of automatic reversal, and between types of prejudice tests
for defining rights at trial. It also clarifies the scope of review that the
Chapman rule and an outcome-oriented prejudice test entail, recon-
ciling these rules with a criminal jury's sixth amendment prerogative to
decide the weight and credibility of the evidence.
This Article's proposed approach to harmless error, which begins
by focusing on the purpose of the particular right violated, would also
lead to a richer and more complete vision of the ultimate purposes of
constitutional criminal procedure. Nowhere is the Supreme Court's in-
creasing obsession with the truth-determination function of the crimi-
nal process more evident than in its opinions regarding harmless
constitutional error. The approach to harmless error proposed here
confronts the Court with the question of whether it is serious about
protecting those rights that do not enhance, and may hinder, the search
for the truth.
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